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ARTICLES
NEW HEARSAY EXCEPTIONS FOR A
CHILD'S STATEMENT OF SEXUAL
ABUSE
GLEN SKOLER*

INTRODUCTION

Within the last two decades the American consciousness
has gradually faced the grim reality that each year approximately 400,000 children are sexually abused.' This realization
has led to increasing criticism of the legal profession for its fail2
ure to effectively respond to this pervasive social problem.
Some commentators have even suggested that legal intervention in response to child sexual abuse often constitutes a second
* M.A. (Psychology) University of Nebraska, 1984; B.A. Georgetown
University, 1977. The author is currently a psychology intern at St.
Elizabeths Hospital, National Institute of Mental Health, Washington D.C.
20032. This article was written prior to the author's employment at St.
Elizabeths Hospital and does not represent the views of St. Elizabeths Hospital or the National Institute of Mental Health.
1.

CHILD SEXUAL ABUSE: INCEST ASSAULT AND SEXUAL EXPLOITATION,

NAT'L CENTER ON CHILD ABUSE & NEGLECT, U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH & HUMAN
SERVICES (1981) (reporting authorities offering a range of possible inci-

dence figures). Most studies, based on statistical projections estimate between 200,000-500,000 cases a year. Estimates vary due to such factors as
the age range covered, the definition of sexual abuse utilized, whether or
not boys were included in the estimate and whether statistical projections
were generated from reported incidents or retrospective interviews. The
U.S. Government's National Center on Child Abuse and Neglect describes
its own estimate of over 100,000 cases per year as conservative. See generally Id. at 1-3. Reported cases probably represent only the "tip of the iceberg." In studies of college students, over 25% of respondents of both sexes
reported that they had been subjected to some form of sexual abuse as children. Id. at 2-3.
2. CHILD SEXUAL ABUSE AND THE LAW, NATIONAL LEGAL RESOURCE
CENTER FOR CHILD ADVOCACY & PROTECTION, AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION

(J. Bulkley 4th ed. 1983) [hereinafter cited as CHILD SEXUAL ABUSE AND THE
LAW]; RECOMMENDATIONS FOR IMPROVING LEGAL INTERVENTION IN INTRAFAMILY CHILD SEXUAL ABUSE CASES, NATIONAL LEGAL RESOURCE
CENTER FOR CHILD ADVOCACY & PROTECTION, AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION
(J. Bulkley 1982) [hereinafter cited as ABA RECOMMENDATIONS]; Parker,
The Rights of Child Witnesses: Is The Court A Protector or Perpetrator?,17
L. REV. 643 (1982) [hereinafter cited as Parker, Child Witnesses].

NEW ENGL.
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victimization of the child. 3 Such critical commentary has inspired several reform proposals designed to mitigate both the
incidence and consequence of child sexual abuse. 4 This article
will assess one of these reform proposals: a new hearsay exception for a child's out-of-court statements of sexual abuse.
To this point, this new hearsay proposal has taken two quite
different forms. The first variant would simply create a new

hearsay exception for a child's statements of sexual abuse.5

Washington 6 and Kansas 7 have adopted this alternative and
their inspiration has stimulated interest and advocacy in other
jurisdictions. The second variant involves the use of videotaped
interviews and depositions which insulate the child victim from
the trauma of open courtroom testimony. The taped proceedings allow for substantial cross-examination but not direct confrontation.8 This approach, to a varying degree, has been
adopted in a few states. 9
The proposed hearsay reform will be analyzed from a
psycho-legal perspective. The issue will be critically evaluated
both on the basis of current legal theory and case law, and on
the basis of our current understanding of child psychology and
the complex dynamics of sexual abuse. Part I briefly outlines
3. SEXUAL ASSAULT OF CHILDREN AND ADOLESCENTS

(A. Burgess, A.

Groth, L. Holmstrom, & S. Sgroi eds. 1978); Bohmer & Blumberg, Twice
Traumatized: The Rape Victim and the Court, 58 JUDICATURE 391, 398-99

(1975); Melton, Child Witnesses and the First Amendment: A Psycholegal
Dilemma, J. Soc. ISSUES (1984) [hereinafter cited as Melton, A
Psycholegal Dilemma]; Melton, Procedural Reforms to Protect Child Victim/Witnesses in Sex Offense Proceedings,in CHILD SEXUAL ABUSE AND THE
LAw, supra note 2, at 184; Parker, Child Witnesses, supra note 2 at 643. See
also Globe Newspaper Co. v. Superior Court, 457 U.S. 596, 608 (1982) (Burger, J., dissenting) (exclusion order in trial of defendant charged with rape
of three minor girls upheld).
4. ABA RECOMMENDATIONS, supra note 2.
5. Some commentators advocate a new additional exception to the
hearsay rule. Others suggest expansion of the res gestae category to include the dynamics of child sexual abuse. See, e.g., Parker, Child Witnesses,
supra note 2, at 674. Still others recommend increased reliance on modern
residual exceptions. See, e.g., Bulkley, Evidentiary Theoriesfor Admitting a
Child's Out-of Court Statement of Sexual Abuse at Trials,in CHILD SEXUAL
ABUSES AND THE LAw, supra note 2, at 153.
6. WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 9A.44.120 (Supp. 1982).
7. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-460(dd) (Supp. 1982).
8. Libai, The Protection of a Child Victim of a Sexual Offense in The
Criminal Justice System, 15 WAYNE L. REV. 977 (1969); Parent-ChildIncest:
Proofat Trial Without Testimony in Court by the Victim, 15 J. L. REFORM 131
(1981) [hereinafter cited as ProvingParent-ChildIncest]; Parker, Child Witnesses, supra note 2.
9. Generally, however, state deposition procedures preserve the defendant's full rights to confrontation and cross-examination. See, e.g., FLA.
STAT. ANN. § 918.17 (West Supp. 1981); MONT. CODE ANN. § 46-15-401 (1981);
N.M.R. CRIM. P. (Dist. Ct.) rule 29.1 (1980) implementing N.M. STAT. ANN.
§ 12-2312 (1982).
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the modern approach to dealing with the problem of child sexual abuse, emphasizing developments and rationales which
have led to the proposed hearsay reform. Part II details the two
variants of the proposed hearsay reform. Part III explores the
constitutionality of the new proposals, primarily by considering
the relationship between the Confrontation Clause and the
hearsay doctrine. Part IV suggests two important theoretical issues raised by the new hearsay exceptions: 1) whether the
traditional rationales which underlie the hearsay rule and the
Confrontation Clause retain their validity when the out-of-court
declarant is a child victim of sexual abuse; and 2) whether the
balancing of competing individual rights and societal interests is
adequately resolved by the essentially evidentiary approach
which the Supreme Court has used to reconcile the hearsay rule
with the Confrontation Clause. Part V uses the legal criteria of
the hearsay rule-Confrontation Clause aggregate, necessity and
indicia of reliability, to organize a brief review of the psychological evidence which may speak to the merits of the hearsay proposals. Part VI summarizes the results of this psycho-legal
analysis and favors further implementation of the proposed
hearsay reform.
I.

THE NEED FOR REFORM

In recent years members of both the legal and mental health
professions have carefully documented the general problem of
child sexual abuse which includes society's long refusal to
reconginze this problem, the power of the incest taboo, and the
dynamics which typify sexual abuse and incestuous families. 10
The initial efforts to confront the public with the issue were well
justified in a society which denied the reality of widespread sexual abuse. Historically, Wigmore appears to have been the most
influential legal authority to formally discount such reports. In
his treatise on evidence he supported his highly personal and
prejudiced beliefs with questionable, inaccurate and sometimes
purposely distorted "scientific evidence."" Due, partly, to Wigmore's influence, some states still require that a child's report of
10. S. BUTLER, CONSPIRACY OF SILENCE (1978); DeFrancis, Protecting
Child Victims of Sex Crimes Committed by Adults, American Humane As-

sociation (1969); J. HERMAN, FATHER-DAUGHTER INCEST (1981); SEXUAL AsSAULT OF CHILDREN AND ADOLESCENTS, supra note 3; The Sexual
Victimology of Youth (Shultz ed. 1980); Katz, Incestuous Families,1 DET. C.

L. REV. 79 (1983).
11. See Beinen, A Question of Credibility: John Henry Wigmore's Use of
Scientific Authority in Section 924a of the Treatise on Evidence, 19 CAL. W.L.
REV. 235 (1983).
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sexual abuse be independently corroborated. 12 From the psychology perspective, Freud was the most influential figure to
deny patient reports of child sexual abuse. 13 He initially believed the reports, but then attributed them to universal incestuous fantasy. 14 Freud's theory of the Oedipal complex would
become one of the central tenets of psychoanalytic theory.
Our society unquestionably lives under the authority of the
incest taboo and has developed strictures to proscribe and punish child sexual abuse. 15 The power of the taboo, however, accounts for the paradox that society not only outlaws child sexual
abuse, but also denies its threatening reality. In prior years, the
issue of child sexual abuse was brought before the public only
by professional commentators. Recently, however, the mass
media has recognized the enormous societal interest in the ancient taboo. Today, it is cultural commonplace to see both the
victims and perpetrators of incest, along with their therapists,
appearing on national talk shows. 16 In many American cities,
school children are informed of the dangers of sexual abuse and
are urged to report such incidents. 17 While these progressive
changes do not typify the general societal response to child sexual abuse, they do represent a marked reversal of the long process of societal denial.
One of the major consequences of our changing attitudes is
that the problem is slowly being shifted from the legal profession to the mental health and social welfare systems. Traditional legal intervention, emphasizes punishment of the
offender over protection of the child. 18 Several experts believe
that this type of intervention constitutes a second or double victimization of the child. 19 The victim may feel punished when
removed from the home, guilty for reporting the offender, and
12. Lloyd, The Corroborationof Sexual Victimization of Children,CHILD
SEXUAL ABUSE AND THE LAw, supra note 2, at 103.

13. See infra notes 168 to 202 and accompanying text.
14. S. FREUD, AN AUTOBIOGRAPHY STUDY (1925); S. FREUD, THE HISTORY
OF THE PSYCHOANALYTIC MOVEMENT (1914).
15. S. FREUD, TOTEM AND TABOO (1913).

16. Within the last year child sexual abuse has also been the subject of
special news features, a T.V. movie and even a popular situation comedy
featuring a child star.
17. For young children, sexual abuse is phrased in terms of "touching
that feels uncomfortable" or "good touching" and "bad touching." Private
parts of the body are sometimes called "red light" areas where the touching
should stop.
18. Katz, supranote 10, at 94; INNOVATIONS IN THE PROSECUTION OF CHILD
SEXUAL ABUSE CASES, NATIONAL LEGAL RESOURCE CENTER FOR CHILD ADVOCACY & PROTECTION, AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION (J. Bulkley 3d ed. 1983).

19. See, e.g., J. GOLDSTEIN, A. FREUD & A.
TERESTS OF THE CHILD 64 (1979); Melton, A

note 3; Parker, Child Witnesses, supra note 2.

SoLNrr, BEFORE THE BEST INPsycholegal Dilemma, supra
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responsible for destroying the family. 20 Progressive programs,
now try to remove the offender from the home rather than the
victim. 21 Subsequent intervention often involves family and individual therapy, with the objectives of returning the offender to
the home, improving the spousal relationship, and reversing the
22
"incest dynamics" within the family.
The foregoing is offered as a preface to emphasize that any
need for hearsay reform to facilitate the prosecution of child
sexual abuse does not imply that prosecution is always recommended. Usually individual and family treatment will be the
preferred intervention depending on the particular strengths of
the offender and the family for positive change. Legal coercion,
however, such as the threat of prosecution or imprisonment,
often serves as an effective catalyst to initiate treatment. Therefore, the ability and willingness of the state to move forward
with an effective prosecution has suddenly become a shared
concern of both the legal and mental health professions.
Rationalesfor a New Hearsay Exception
Child sexual abuse cases are generally considered difficult
to prosecute. 2 3 Often the only witnesses to the incident are the
adult perpetrator and the child victim. Depending on the type of
20. GOLDSTEIN, FREUD & SOLNIT, supranote 19, at 64; SEXUAL ASSAULT OF
supra note 3; THE SEXUAL VICTIMOLOGY OF
YOUTH, supra note 10; Katz, supra note 10. These reactions are in part reCHILDREN AND ADOLESCENTS,

lated to certain incest dynamics which inappropriately place a great deal of
responsibility and blame on the incest victim.
21. INNOVATIONS IN THE PROSECUTION OF CHILD SEXUAL ABUSE CASES,

supra note 18; Katz, supra note 10; MacFarlane & Bulkley, Treating Child
Abuse: An Overview of Current Program Models, in Social Work and Child
Sexual Abuse, I, J. HUM. SEXUALITY & SOC. WORK (1982).
22. Giaretto, Humanistic Treatment of Father-DaughterIncest, 1 CHILD
ABUSE & NEGLECT 411 (1977); Giaretto and Sgroi, Coordinated Community
Treatment of Incest, in SEXUAL ASSAULT OF CHILDREN AND ADOLESCENTS 231

(1978); Katz, supra note 10; MacFarlane &Bulkley, supra note 21. Offenders, however, are not as amenable to treatment as one might expect. They
tend to use a strong system of denial and rationalization to account for their

inappropriate contacts with children. Denial and rationalization are common defenses. Typical excuses include claims that the perpetrator was per-

forming a medical or hygienic examination, was conducting sex education
and checking for signs of sexual activity. It is also common to accuse the
victim of lying, being sexually provocative or taking revenge for parental
discipline. Although treatment can be effective, some level of coercion is
often initially required. A pre-trial diversion program which offers treatment in lieu of prosecution is one alternative which has been successfully
used to insure the offenders initial investment in the treatment process.
Post conviction alternatives offer other means of requiring treatment for the
offender. ABA RECOMMENDATIONS, supra note 2, at 24-26. See also INNOVAsupra note 18.
23. See CHILD SEXUAL ABUSE AND THE LAw, supra note 2; ABA RECOMMENDATIONS, supra note 2.

TIONS IN THE PROSECUTION OF CHILD SEXUAL ABUSE CASES,
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sexual contact, corroborating physical evidence may be absent
or inconclusive. 24 It is not unusual for a child to retract a true
report of sexual abuse due to guilt, fear of reprisal or anxiety
that the offender will be sent to prison.2 5 When a child retracts
his report and refuses to testify, that child becomes unavailable
as a witness.

26

The child victim may also be rendered unavaila-

ble as a witness due to his "extremely tender years. '27 Under
such circumstances, the child's prior out-of-court statements are
often the only probative evidence available. These factors make
it difficult to prosecute a child sexual abuse case. The use of a
child victim's out-of-court statements would enhance the prosecution of an alleged child abuser without violating the defendant's constitutional rights.
Even if the child is legally available to testify as a witness,
there are many factors which suggest that the child's out-ofcourt statements may be inherently reliable. Indeed several
commentators question the reliability of the child victim's testimony in an open courtroom. 28 In addition, there are cognitive
and developmental limitations which constrain the child's abil29
ity to relate events under the pressures of cross-examination.
Because of these emotional and cognitive factors, a child's outof-court statements of sexual abuse may be more reliable than a
child's actual in-court testimony, regardless of the child's availa30
bility as a witness.
Another rationale for creating a new hearsay exception for
child reports of sexual abuse is to avoid the trauma of trial preparation and testimony.3 1 Conceivably the trauma could be so severe as to render the child's testimony unreliable or render him
unavailable. Many child advocates feel that the victims should
be spared the trauma of testifying regardless of the issues of
availability or reliability. Chief Justice Burger expressed the
common held belief that, the experience of testifying in an open
24. Lloyd, supra note 12.
25. See infra notes 67 to 167 and accompanying text.
26. See, e.g., FED. R. EviD. 804(a)(2) (witness "unavailable" when he

"persists in refusing to testify"). See also State v. Middleton, 294 Or. 427, 657
P.2d 1215 (1983).
27. United States v. Nick, 604 F.2d 1199, 1202 (9th Cir. 1979).
28. Melton, ProceduralReforms, supra note 3, at 184.
29. Melton, Children's Competency to Testify, 5 L. & Hum. BEHAV. 73
(1981) [hereinafter cited as Melton, Children's Competency].
30. Melton, ProceduralReforms, supra note 3, at 189.
31. Melton, A Psycholegal Dilemma, supra note 3 (discussing the controversy over the presumed trauma of testimony for child
victim/witnesses).
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'32
courtroom "can be devastating and leave permanent scars.
There are three rationales which are generally offered in
support of a new hearsay exception for child reports of sexual
abuse. The first rationale is necessity. The second rationale recognizes the inherent reliability of the child's hearsay testimony.
The third rationale acknowledges the need to protect child victims from the trauma of courtroom testimony. These rationales
support the argument that a new hearsay exception for child reports of sexual abuse is necessary, inherently reliable and
serves a sound societal interest in protecting children from
"devastating" and "permanent scars."

Is A New Hearsay Exception Really Necessary?
Even if the reasons for admitting a child's out-of-court statements of sexual abuse into evidence are persuasive, there still
remains the question of whether a new exception to the hearsay
rule is necessary to accomplish that purpose. 33 In the past,
hearsay has been admitted under the traditional exceptions to
the hearsay rule and more recently under modern residual or
"catch-all" exceptions. 34 Reliance on the traditional hearsay exceptions to admit child statements of abuse often results in "tortured" interpretations of the traditional exceptions. 35 The use of
the excited utterance or res gestae exception demonstrates the
judicial system's frustrated attempts to stretch a traditional
hearsay exception to cover the pervasive and unique problem of
child sexual abuse. In the course of expanding the allowable
time intervals for excited utterances, some courts have demonstrated a good understanding of the dynamics of sexual abuse,
noting that children may not immediately complain because of
threats, fear, guilt and other pressures to keep the incident "a
secret. '36 Other courts have observed that "children of tender
years are generally not adept at reasoned reflection and the con32. Globe Newspaper Co. v. Superior Ct., 457 U.S. 596, 608 (1982) (Burger, J., dissenting).
33. Bulkley, supra note 2, at 153; ABA RECOMMENDATIONS, supra note 2,

at 34-36.
34. Bulkley, supra note 2, at 153. For example, depending on the circumstances of each case, child statements of sexual abuse could be admitted into evidence under the following exceptions of the federal hearsay

rule: FED. R. EVID. 803(1) (present sense impression); FED. R. EVID. 803(2)
(excited utterances); FED. R. EVID. 803(3) (then existing mental emotional

or physical condition); FED. R. EVID. 803(4) (statements for purposes of
medical diagnosis or treatment); FED. R. EVID. 803(24) & 804(b)(5) (other

exceptions, i.e., the "catch-all");

FED.

R. EviD.801 (d) (1) (prior statement by

witness as non-hearsay); FED. R. EVID. 804(b) (1) (former testimony).
35. Bulkley, supra note 2, at 153.

36. Id. at 156, 163 n.29.
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coction of false stories under such circumstances. '3 7 Despite
such an enlightened approach to the problem, courts are still
placed in a difficult situation when the traditional exception is
the only means of admitting a child's statements of sexual
abuse. Either the court is bound by the inherent limitations of
the excited utterance exception, which does not and cannot fit
even the typical report of abuse, or the court is forced to liberalize the exception until it has lost its original meaning. Thus,
courts have admitted "excited utterances" which have been the
subject of much reflection and which have been uttered days,
'3 8
weeks and even months after the "startling event.
After considering the limitations of the traditional hearsay
exceptions some commentators have urged liberal use of the
modern residual or catch-all exception to admit child reports of
abuse into evidence.3 9 Most residual exceptions, however, are
still "exceptions in search of a rule." 4° Courts vary in their interpretation. While the interests of justice may be served by admitting reliable hearsay on a case by case basis, there appears
to be no clear understanding of how a new hearsay exception
could be established under the residual exceptions-if in fact
that was ever the drafters' intent. Another drawback to reliance
on the residual exceptions is that they are too strict. In certain
instances they are stricter than Confrontation Clause requirements. Specifically, it is unreasonable to require that a child's
statement be "more probative on the point for which it is offered
than any other evidence which the proponent can procure
through reasonable efforts."' 41 Moreover, residual exceptions
will often face Confrontation Clause challenges, and still courts
seem confused about the relationship between the two. 42 There
is some language in Ohio v. Roberts43 which suggests that "indicia of reliability" may be established differentially, depending
on whether the hearsay falls within a firmly rooted exception.
Given the present confusion, to assume that the residual exceptions are adequate to comprise child reports of sexual abuse,
37. Soto v. Territory, 12 Ariz. 36, 94 P. 1104 (1908) (utterance of minor
child need not be contemporaneous with event in order to be admissible as

it is unlikely to be premeditated); Lancaster v. People, 200 Colo.448, 450, 615
P.2d 720, 723 (1980).
38. Bulkley, supra note 2, at 156, 163 n.28.
39. ABA RECOMMENDATIONS, supra note 2, at 35; CHILD SExUAL ABUSE
AND THE LAw, supra note 2 at 158-61.
40. Sonenshein, The Residual Exceptions to the Federal Hearsay Rule:
Two Exceptions In Search of a Rule, 57 N.Y.U. L. REV. 867 (1982).
41. United States v. Perez, 658 F.2d 654, 661 n.6 (9th Cir. 1981) (citing the
residual exceptions in FED. R. EVID. 803(24)(b)) and 804(b) (5) (B).
42. Sonenshein, supra note 40, at 895-98.
43. 448 U.S. 56, 67 (1980).
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is merely to say that judges, without guidance and with varying
appreciation of the problem of child sexual abuse, will decide
these issues on a case by case basis. The theoretical issue of
whether the residual exceptions will finally put an end to the
common law tradition of individualized exceptions to the hearsay rule is an important issue.4 The need, however, under the
present law, is for a new exception.
II.

THE HEARSAY PROPOSALS:

Two

VARIANTs

Washington and Kansas were the first two states to recognize the need for a new hearsay exception. 45 The Washington
exception requires that the child victim be under ten years of
age and applies only to incidents of sexual contact. 46 The court
must find that the time, content and circumstances of the child's
statement provide sufficient "indicia of reliability." If the child
is unavailable as a witness, then corroborative evidence of the
4 7
act must be established.
The Kansas statute, 48 on the other hand, is not limited to
sexual abuse but includes criminal proceedings, as well as child
deprivation and need of care proceedings. The court must find
that the child victim is unavailable as a witness, that the statement is "apparently reliable," and that the child was not induced to make the statement.
Both statutes were drafted with the knowledge that this
new type of admissible hearsay would be subject to Confrontation Clause challenges. Both statutes adopt the standards set
forth in Ohio v. Roberts for resolving Confrontation Clause challenges to the hearsay rule.4 9 Conceptually, the statutes are
quite similar but there are differences. The Kansas law requires
a finding of reliability, while the Washington statute requires
not only indicia of reliability but corroborative evidence of the
act when the witness is unavailable. This additional requirement for corroborative evidence not only acts as an added guarantee of trustworthiness, but also addresses the due process
problem of convicting a defendant solely on the basis of hearsay
44. ABA RECOMMENDATIONS, supra note
AND THE LAW, supra note 2, at 158-59.

2, at 35;

CHILD SEXUAL ABUSE

§ 9A.44.120 (West Supp. 1984). KAN. STAT.
§ 60-640(dd) (1983). There is also a notification clause similar to that
found in the federal residual exception. FED. RULE EVID. 803(24) &
804(b) (5).
45. WASH. REV. CODE ANN.

ANN.

46. WASH.
47. Id.
48.

REV. CODE

KAN. STAT. ANN.

ANN. § 9A.44.120 (West Supp. 1984).

§ 60-640(dd) (1983).

49. Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 67-68 (1980).
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declarations. 50 Interestingly, the Kansas law requires unavailability, while the Washington law does not. The Supreme Court
has held that subsequent cross-examination of the declarant at
trial satisfies the Confrontation Clause.5 1 Nevertheless, the
state or federal jurisdiction must establish some provision for
admitting the evidence under the hearsay rule. It is difficult to
discern from the Kansas statute whether the drafters of the provision erroneously considered only Ohio v. Roberts,5 2 an unavailability case, or whether they intended to exclude the hearsay
declarations of available child witnesses. The statutes also differ in that the Washington law is limited to only incidents of sexual abuse and establishes an age limit of nine, a time which
precedes significant developmental gains in cognitive, social,
53
and sexual maturity.
Aside from these differences, however, the Washington and
Kansas laws are basically the same. Both laws recognize the
need for and establish a new hearsay exception for a child's outof-court statements of abuse. Both clearly rely on the necessity
and reliability standards of Ohio v. Roberts as a means of withstanding Confrontation Clause challenges. Whether these laws
will ultimately be upheld as constitutional is still a matter of
speculation.
Child Courtrooms and Videotaped Depositions
There is a second type of proposal for admitting a child's
statements of sexual abuse into evidence. Although this proposal involves admitting hearsay testimony, it is conceptually different from the approach adopted by Washington and Kansas.
This second proposal has many variants, but generally involves
the use of closed circuit or videotaped interviews and depositions which are offered into evidence at the criminal trial. Such
procedures usually permit cross-examination of the child victim,
but prohibit direct confrontation.5 4 The child victim is thereby
insulated from the trauma of repetititous courtroom
testimony. 55
50. This "corroboration" requirement should not be confused with the
controversial laws requiring additional evidence to "corroborate" the child
complainant's account.
51. Nelson v. O'Neill, 402 U.S. 622 (1971); California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149
(1970), on remand sub. nom. People v. Green, 3 Cal. 3d 981, 479 P.2d 998, 92
Cal. Rptr. 494 (1971), cert. granted Green v. California 404 U.S. 801 (1972).

52. 448 U.S. 56 (1980).
53. See infra notes 168 to 202 and accompanying text.
54. Libai, supra note 8; Parker, Child Witnesses, supra note 2; Proving
Parent-ChildIncest, supra note 8.
55. See supra note 31.
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This second proposal takes many different forms, ranging on
a continuum from a formal deposition with full cross-examination in the physical presence of the defendant, to a videotaped
interview in a playroom between the child victim and a trained
social worker. 56 Modern commentators who favor such alternatives often credit David Libai5 7 for underscoring the plight of the
child victim-witness and initiating legal reforms. After documenting the problem of child sexual abuse and noting the often
deleterious effects of classical legal intervention, Libai offered
several proposals to protect the child victim in the course of legal proceedings. He urged that the initial interview with the
child victim be conducted by a specially trained police officer
and that the interview be taped and later admitted into evidence.5 8 He also suggested that under certain circumstances
the child victim should be declared unavailable to testify. Another Libai proposal involved a special child courtroom which
59
would ensure a less intimidating environment.
Inspired by Libai, Dustin Ordway advocated that the child
victim's only contact with the legal system be through a social
worker.60 All interviews would be taped. If legal proceedings
progressed, all inquiries would be submitted by attorneys to the
social worker who would then question the child. After viewing
videotaped responses, attorneys could again submit questions
through the social worker until the social worker felt that the
limit of reasonable inquiry had been reached. Ordway's is one
of the most liberal and non-traditional proposals and, according
61
to Ordway, should apply only to incest cases.
One of the most recent, comprehensive and scholarly proposals has come from Jacqueline Parker. 62 Her model act refines and augments several of Libai's proposals. She advocates
that the child be protected and interviewed by a child hearing
officer (CHO) who is an attorney, specially trained in child psychology, social work, clinical interviewing, and nursing. Parker's
is a far ranging proposal which allows the court to make various
modifications to standard procedures at which the child would
normally be required to testify and submit to cross-examination.
One such procedure would be a special deposition taken in a
child hearing courtroom (CHC) which would include only the
56.
57.
58.
59.

Proving Parent-ChildIncest, supra note 8.
See Libai, supra note 8, at 1000.
Id. at 1002.
Id. at 1014-25. The defendant would be required to be seated outside

the physical presence of the child, behind a one way mirror.
60. Proving Parent-ChildIncest, supra note 8.
61. Id.
62. Parker, Child Witnesses, supra note 2.
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judge, child victim, CHO, and perhaps a trusted adult. 63 The defendant and members of the public would sit behind a one-way
mirror. Actual questioning both on direct and cross-examination would be conducted by the CHO or by the parties' attorneys, with the CHO reserving the right to disallow or rephrase
questions which are too harsh or upsetting for the child. This
special deposition would be admissible in lieu of live testimony
under the rationale that, by participating in the deposition procedure, the defense has waived the right to any furter cross-examination, and that the judge, by granting the request for a
deposition, has deemed the child "psychologically unavailable"
to testify at a subsequent trial. 64 Under the hearsay doctrine,
the deposition would be admitted as prior testimony based on
the unavailability of the witness. In addition to this deposition
procedure, Parker would also allow for testimony at trial, but
only in the special child hearing courtroom. Even during this
phase of testimony, Parker suggests that portions of taped interviews between the CHO and the child victim could be introduced in lieu of live testimony when questions during crossexamination have previously been posed by the CHO in other
taped proceedings or interviews. 65 Parker also advocates expansion of the spontaneous utterances or res gestae exception to the
hearsay rule to include child reports of abuse. 66 This additional
proposal is similar to the Washington and Kansas state laws; the
difference is that Parker would simply expand the res gestae exception rather than trying to establish a new hearsay
67
exception.
The public policy interest in protecting child victims of sexual assault is not limited to the United States. In fact the United
States would be rather embarrassed to compare its treatment of
child victims to that of its European allies. 68 However, foreign
63.
64.
65.
66.
67.

Id.
Id. at 668-69.
Id. at 670.
Id. at 674-77.
To date, at least 4 states have some type of provision which allows

for the videotaped deposition of a child victim of sexual abuse. See supra

note 9. New Mexico, for example, provides that such a deposition is admissible into evidence as an exception to the hearsay rule if the child is unable
to testify without suffering unreasonable and unnecessary mental or emotional harm. N.M.R. CRoI. P. (Dist. Ct.) Rule 29.1(a) (1980). However, unlike Parker's Model Act, the New Mexico statute stipulates that the
defendant be present, represented by counsel and given an adequate opportunity to cross-examine at the deposition. Even in the course of drafting

this provision, serious questions were raised about the constitutionality of
not requiring an available witness to confront the accused at trial. See infra
text accompanying notes 67 to 167.
68. Scandinavian countries, which have preserved the right to confron-

tation, use specially trained police women to investigate child reports of
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judicial systems are not constrained by the Confrontation
Clause of the sixth amendment of the United States Constitution. To institute similar systems in this country, one must address the complex and confusing relationship between the
hearsay doctrine and the Confrontation Clause. Although
Libai's original proposals have stimulated much interest in this
country, Parker 69 accurately notes that his legal analysis is outdated and weak, particularly in his attempts to analogize between the sixth and first amendments. Subsequent
commentators, like Ordway and Parker who admire Libai more
as a child advocate than a legal scholar, have adopted Libai's
reform proposals while developing more updated and convincing rationales. Their arguments for admitting into evidence
taped interviews and special depositions are, on the surface,
very seductive, and are as follows:
In Ohio v. Roberts the Supreme Court approached the problem of
reconciling the Confrontation Clause with the hearsay rule by establishing the criteria of unavailability and indicia of reliability.
Proposals for admitting into evidence taped interviews and special
depositions meet both of these tests. The unavailability test is met
because the nature of the crime and the trauma of subsequent testimony renders the child victim "psychologically unavailable."
Even if the child is literally available to testify at trial, surely the
societal costs of traumatizing child victims are just as severe as the
undue delay or cost of obtaining out-of-state witnesses. The reliability test is also fulfilled because specially structured taped interviews and depositions which provide for the substantial equivalent
of cross-examination, imbue this type of hearsay testimony with a
very high degree of reliability. This degree of reliability, provided
by substantial cross-examination, even exceeds the reliability of
other hearsay exceptions, which have70been admitted in the past
over Confrontation Clause challenges.
child sexual abuse. In Stockholm these special police officers are actually
nurses. The child's statements are tape recorded with the goal of reducing
the need for the child to repeat his story. Melton, Procedural Reforms,
supra note 3, at 185, 195 n. 8. England provides that the deposition of a child
may be admitted into evidence in lieu of live testimony when the court finds
evidence that the process of testifying would endanger the child's life or
health. Parker, Child Witnesses, supra note 2, at 680. The most progressive
system for protecting child victims of sexual abuse was instituted by Israel
in 1955. Melton, ProceduralReforms, supra note 3, at 185, 195 nn. 4-7. In any
sex offense case involving a child under 14, a specially trained youth examiner interviews the child. No interrogation of the child or testimony by him
may occur without the approval of the youth examiner. Children testify in
only 14% of the cases. Usually only the youth examiner appears in court.
D. Reifen, Court Proceduresin Israel to Protect Child-Victims of Sexual Assaultin 3 VICTIOLOGY: A NEW Focus 106 (I. Drapkin &E. Viano eds. 1975).
69. Parker, Child Witnesses, supra note 2, at 646-47.
70. This argument is a summary of the reasoning offered in Parker,
Child Witnesses, supranote 2 and Proving Parent-ChildIncest, supra note 8.
Oddly, Parker only briefly references Roberts. She does cite, however, the
line of cases leading to Roberts. Relying on earlier commentary, she pri-
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There are several problems with this reasoning. These
problems will be analyzed in the next part which discusses Roberts and the Supreme Court's attempt to reconcile the hearsay
rule with the Confrontation Clause. The two hearsay proposals
for child victims of sexual abuse, one establishing a new hearsay
exception and the other advocating the use of special depositions, rely on Roberts for their justification. An understanding of
the Court's approach in Roberts therefore is essential to assess
the constitutionality of these two new hearsay proposals.
III.

HEARSAY, THE CONFRONTATION CLAUSE AND CROSSEXAMINATION

Reconciling the Confrontation Clause with the hearsay rule
is a complex and confusing problem. 71 In fact, there have been
only nine major decisions rendered by the Supreme Court on
this subject since 1965.72 The Court itself has acknowledged the
slow formulation of a clear policy:
True to the common-law tradition, the process has been gradual,
building on past decisions, drawing on new experience, and responding to changing conditions. The Court has not sought to
"map out a theory of the Confrontation Clause that would determine the validity of all hearsay 'exceptions.' "73
The common-law doctrine against hearsay is riddled with
exceptions. 74 The Confrontation Clause of the sixth amendment
states: "In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the
75
right... to be confronted with the witnesses against him.
Taken literally, the Clause would render all hearsay exceptions
inadmissible. This approach has long been rejected by the
Court, which instead interprets the Clause as reflecting a "preference for face-to-face confrontation at trial, and that 'a primary
interest secured by (the provision) is the right of cross-examinamarily views unavailability as the touchstone of the Confrontation Clause
while minimizing the reliability issue.
71. Few tasks in criminal evidence are more perplexing than to describe the effect of the Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment
upon the hearsay doctrine. Signals from the Supreme Court point in
different directions, the views of commentators differ, and while the
subject is as potentially vast as the hearsay doctrine itself, benchmarks
in the form of authoritative decisions are few and far between.
4 D. LOUISELL & C. MUELLER, FEDERAL EVIDENCE § 418 at 123 (1980).
72. Id. at 133.

73. Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 64-65 (1980) (quoting California

v.

Green,

399 U.S. 149, 162 (1970)).

74. FED. R. EvID. art. VIII, Advisory Committee's Note, Introductory
Note, at 89 (West 1975).

75. U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
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tion.' "76 The right of confrontation is not absolute and may give
way to competing public policy interests. 77 In those nine cases
since 1965, the Court has tried to reconcile the Confrontation
Clause with the hearsay doctrine and considerations of public
policy.

78

Ohio v. Roberts79 represents the Court's most recent attempt to accomplish this difficult task. Roberts, although the
leading case, is not original in its analysis or interpretation of
the Confrontation Clause. Rather it represents an articulation
and clarification of themes developed in prior cases. In Roberts,
the Court noted the divergence of scholarly commentary and
forcefully stated that it does not intend to "start anew" its Confrontation Clause analysis.8 0 Therefore, Roberts may be considsignificant as an expositor of the Confrontation
ered "highly
'8 1
Clause."
The facts in Roberts are notable in that they differ markedly
from the fact situation which will usually be presented under
the two new hearsay proposals for child reports of sexual abuse.
Roberts involved prior (preliminary hearing) testimony of a witness who was physically unavailable to testify at trial. This form
of hearsay is different than the type of "excited utterance"
which would be admitted under the Washington and Kansas
state laws. It is also different
from formalized child depositions
82
intended for use at trial.
The Supreme Court held that the prosecution made a good
faith effort to locate the witness and that the preliminary hearing testimony, although not formal cross-examination, bore the
substantial equivalence of cross-examination to establish its reliability. The Court used the criteria of unavailability and reliability to set forth a general approach for reconciling the hearsay
doctrine with the Confrontation Clause:
In sum, when a hearsay declarant is not present for cross-examination at trial, the Confrontation Clause normally requires a showing
that he is unavailable. Even then his statement is admissible only
if it bears adequate "indicia of reliability." Reliability can be inferred without more in a case where the evidence falls within a
firmly rooted hearsay exception. In other cases, the evidence must
be excluded, at least absent a showing of particularized guarantees
76. Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 63 (quoting Douglas v. Alabama, 380 U.S.
415, 418(1965)).
77. Id.
78. See supra note 71, at 133.
79. 448 U.S. 56 (1980).
80. Id. at 67 n.9.
81. LoUISELL & MUELLER, supra note 71, § 418 at 150 (1980).
82. Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56 (1980).
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83

Roberts and the Child Victim Declarant
How well do the two new hearsay proposals for child reports
of sexual abuse conform to the holding in Ohio v. Roberts? The
first proposal, established by Washington 84 and Kansas, 85 read
literally, conforms quite well to the Roberts standards. This is
not surprising since both statutes were carefully drafted with
Roberts in mind. The Washington state law, for example, admits
sufficiently reliable hearsay whether the declarant is available
or not. Roberts seems to require unavailability because, under
the facts of that case, there were no means to confront the hearsay declarant through the process of cross-examination. However, in the line of cases leading to Roberts,86 the Court had
indicated that subsequent cross-examination of the hearsay declarant at trial would satisfy the Confrontation Clause, because,
under such circumstances, the defendant does have the opportunity to confront the witness against him. If the witness is unavailable, then both statutes require a finding of particularized
reliability while the Washington state law also requires corroborating evidence of the act to protect both confrontation and
due processs interests. Thus, in the case of a hearsay declarant
who does not testify at the proceeding, both laws appear to meet
the necessity and reliability standards of Roberts.
The fact that the Washington and Kansas hearsay exceptions adopted the Language of Roberts, however, does not guarantee the constitutionality of the new exceptions. Roberts left
many questions unanswered. For example, what constitutes unavailability? In Roberts, that issue was clear. The witness could
not be located and the only related question was whether the
prosecution made a reasonable and good faith effort to locate
her. Nevertheless, there are many different ways to view a child
victim as unavailable to testify. The case of a child victim who is
too traumatized to testify or who refuses to testify appears to
constitute unavailability and is consistent with evidentiary definitions of unavailability.8 7 What about the child victim of incest
who retracts her or his story prior to trial?88 This situation is a
typical one and raises the odd constitutional possibility of declaring a victim-witness unavailable due to a formal recantation
83. Id. at 67.

84.

WASH. REV. CODE ANN.

§ 9A.44.120 (West Supp. 1984).

85. KAN. STAT. ANN.§ 60-640(dd) (1983).
86. See supra note 58.
87. FED. R. Evm. 804(a) (2); FED. R. EVID. 804(a) (4).
88. See infra text accompanying notes 67 to 167.
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as a means of admitting the hearsay version of the original
charge. One state supreme court has recently allowed expert
testimony as to whether a child's recantation of a rape accusation against her father was congruent with a pattern of intrafamilial sexual abuse. 89
Another question pertains to the good faith effort to make a
child-witness available to testify. In the case of an out-of-state
witness, like Roberts, it might involve sending subpoenas and
trying to locate the witness. In a case of child abuse, could it
involve having to refer the child to a special incest counselor to
help the child feel more comfortable about testifying in court?
And then there is the concept of "psychological unavailability."
Can an available witness be rendered unavailable to testify because there is a probability that he or she will suffer psychological damage during the process of testifying? There is some
language in Roberts which suggests that unavailability, in the
sense of physical absence, is not always required. This dictum
referes to Dutton v. Evans,90 one of the major cases prior to Roberts, in which "the Court found the utility of trial confrontation
so remote that it did not require the prosecution to produce a
seemingly available witness." 91 It would be difficult to apply
this dictum to cases of child sexual abuse in which the child victim is usually the key and often the only witness against the defendant. Naturally, many child right's advocates and mental
health professionals would like all of these questions regarding
unavailability to be resolved in favor of the child victim. Roberts, however, left most of these questions unanswered.
There are just as many unanswered questions regarding
"indicia of reliability" in cases of child sexual abuse. Roberts
suggests that reliability can be inferred when the evidence falls
within a firmly rooted hearsay exception; otherwise a showing of
particularized guarantees of trustworthiness is required. 92 Roberts, however, may not really be on point with the Washington
and Kansas statutes. How courts will assess the reliability of
children too frightened to testify or who retract their stories is
unknown. Will expert testimony on typical incest dynamics be
admissible to help assess the reliability of both the hearsay declaration and the retraction? Often the same expert who first
hears the child's report will later assess its reliability. What role
will this expert play in establishing reliability?
89. State v. Middleton, 294 Or.427, 657 P.2d 1215 (1983).

90. 400 U.S. 74 (1970).
91. Roberts, 448 U.S. at 65 n.7.
92. Id. at 67.
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In summary, although it may be easy to see that the new
Washington and Kansas hearsay exceptions conform to the
wording of Roberts, Roberts is not a child abuse case, nor did it
struggle with the difficult issues which arise under the Washington and Kansas hearsay exceptions. In fact, Roberts establishes
phrases which are rather vague and subjective, as are many
newly pronounced principles of constitutional interpretation.
Unavailability must be established by good faith and reasonable
efforts. Reliability must be established by certain "indicia of reliability" and "guarantees of trustworthiness." What Roberts really means, and how it will be applied in cases of child sexual
abuse, if at all, remains unanswered.
Videotaped Depositions and Roberts: "Is it Hearsay?"
Proposals for admitting into evidence taped interviews and
special depositions in cases of child sexual abuse also rely heavily on Roberts for their justification. 93 The basic argument is
that a child victim is rendered "psychologically unavailable" to
testify, and that taped interviews and deposition procedures,
which have a substantial equivalence of cross-examination,
guarantee a very high degree of reliability.9 4 This reliance on
Roberts appears straightforward, but there are several problems
with this type of reasoning. First, it expands the notion of unavailability far beyond the holding in Roberts. Second, to argue
that the prior testimony exception is reliable is unconvincing.
Depositions have always been acknowledged as highly reliable
but are relegated to the judicial preference for live testimony.
Third, it confuses and ignores the public policy interests and
considerations which distinguish depositions from other forms
of hearsay. Finally, it ignores the real issue in advocating the
use of taped interviews and depositions which is the balancing
of interests between protecting the child victim and the judicial
preference of available witnesses. Sole reliance on Roberts, in
an attempt to conform to Roberts, may not be necessary and
may confuse the examination of important competing public
interests.
The notion of psychological unavailability is radically different from the kind of physical unavailability which the Roberts
court considered. Many evidence codes, such as the Federal
Rules of Evidence, recognize that a witness may be unavailable
due to a then existing mental illness or infirmity.95 But the concept of psychological unavailability is meant to be broader in
93. Proving Parent-ChildIncest, supra note 8.
94. See supra note 70 and accompanying text.
95. FED. R. EviD. 804(a) (4).
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scope and would be invoked for many children solely because
the experience of testifying might produce further psychological
harm.96 At this point, "psychological unavailability" becomes
merely a way of using the language in Roberts to assert that the
unavailability requirement of Roberts should be balanced
against the competing
state interest in protecting child victims
97
of sexual abuse.
The Roberts criterion of unavailability is thus supposedly
overcome by the notion of "psychological unavailability." Once
this hurdle is cleared, the Roberts criterion of "indicia of reliability" seems easily satisfied because the proposed taped child interviews and depositions allow for the "substantial equivalence
of cross-examination" 98 in the form of questions submitted to
the child. The basic problem with hearsay is that it usually
lacks the protections of live testimony which require the witness
to testify: (1) under oath, (2) in the personal presence of the
trier of fact and (3) subject to cross-examination. Today, hearsay analysis tends to center on cross-examination.9 9 To absolutely require all three conditions and ban all hearsay would,
however, deprive the trier of fact of probative evidence. The
common law solution has been to establish a rule against hearsay but to admit several necessary exceptions under circumstances which theoretically guarantee trustworthiness. 10 0 While
the Confrontation Clause is meant to exclude some forms of
hearsay, the Supreme Court has repeatedly recognized the "truism that 'hearsay rules and the Confrontation Clause are generally designed to protect similar values... and stem from the
same roots.' "101 Actually the necessity and reliability criteria of
Roberts are not much different than the usual common law rationales for allowing hearsay exceptions. 10 2 Advocates of taped interviews and depositions argue that they are reliable because
03
they contain the recognized protections of live testimony.
Furthermore this type of proposal is said to provide a much
96. Melton, A PsycholegalDilemma, supra note 3; see infra text accompanying notes 67 to 167.

97. See infra text accompanying notes 67 to 167.
98. Roberts, 448 U.S. at 67-73.
99. FED. R. EviD. art. VIII, Advisory Committee's Note, Introductory
Note; see also Roberts, 448 U.S. at 70.
100. Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 67 (1980). See E. CLEARY, MCCORMICK
ON EVIDENCE

&244 (2d ed. 1972) (history of rule).

101. Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 67 (1980).
102. Gutman, Academic Determinism: The Division of the Bill of Rights,

54 S. CAL. L. REV. 295, 331-55 (1981); see infra notes 67 to 167 and accompanying text.
103. See Parker, Child Witnesses, supra note 2, at 695; Proving ParentChild Incest, supra note 8, at 149-51.
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greater degree of reliability than other hearsay exceptions
which lack all three conditions of live testimony and which the
Supreme Court has repeatedly allowed over Confrontation
04
Clause challenges.
The problem with this type of analysis is that it ignores, for
no apparent reason, the important policy issue of regularly using taped depositions of available witnesses as a substitute for
the trial process. The fact that deposition testimony is just as
good as or better than other forms of hearsay is therefore unconvincing. Deposition testimony has long been acknowledged to
be one of the most reliable forms of hearsay, yet it is usually
admitted only under strict standards of unavailability.10 5 Perhaps the area of confusion here is that a deposition, although
technically hearsay under the prior testimony exception, is conceptually different than most forms of hearsay and implicates
related, but different policy interests. This difference creates
the supposed logical inconsistencies identified by commentators
when they assess the constitutionality of new forms of depositions by relying on a case such as Roberts.10 6
104. Such exceptions include dying declarations, see Ohio v. Roberts, 448

U.S. 56, 64 (1980) and excited utterances, see United States v. Iron Shell, 633
F.2d 77 (8th Cir. 1980).
105. See supra note 95.

106. McCormick includes depositions (depositions to preserve evidence
only) in the definition of former testimony and notes that deposition testimony may be classified, depending upon the precise formulation of the rule
against hearsay, as an exception to the hearsay prohibition or as a class of
evidence in which the requirements of the hearsay rule are complied with.
C. MCCORMICK, LAW OF EVIDENCE § 254, at 614 (2d ed. 1972). See, e.g., FED. R.
CrIM. P. 15. Wigmore favored this latter position, which is interesting, given
Wigmore's minimization and misinterpretation of the Confrontation
Clause. C. MCCORMICK, LAw OF EVIDENCE § 254, at 614; 5 WIGMORE, EviDENCE 131 (3d ed. 1940); see also Gutman, supra note 102. McCormick takes

the former position, that deposition testimony is hearsay, for the reason
that it is the familiar usuage to the profession and that it facilitates the
wider admissions of former testimony under a liberalized exception. C. MCCORMICK, supra, § 254, at 614-15. He does however emphasize the need for
further reform. Like the modern advocates of taped child depositions, McCormick realizes that, compared to other hearsay exceptions such as excited utterances, the restrictions upon declarations in the form of sworn
testimony seem "fantastically strict." C. McCoRMICK, supra § 261 at 626.

McCormick's solution is to urge liberality under the former testimony, by

suggesting that the standard of unavailability of the witness should be no
more exacting than that for depositions under the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure, with this caveat: "In criminal cases, the constitutional right of
confrontation imposes stricter standards of unavailability." C. MCCORMICK,
§ 261 at 626.

One commentator who advocates the liberal use of videotape in criminal proceedings, takes a more radical position and argues that Confrontation Clause considerations may not even be pertinent:
[T] he "trial" includes both the taping session and the presentation
of the tape to the jury. The "court" includes both the room in which the
jury observes the testimony and the room in which the testimony was
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The foregoing analysis is not offered to discourage the use of
videotaped depositions in cases of child abuse, but to suggest
that reliance on the Roberts unavailability and reliability standards is misleading. The concept of psychological unavailability
will usually mean little more than that there are important competing public policy interests in protecting child victims of sextaped. For these same reasons, questions of availability to not arise.
The witness is available, and he is testifying before the jury.
Barber & Bates, Videotape in Criminal Proceeding,25 HASTINGS L. J. 1017,
1037. This "modern" interpretation sounds more like Wigmore's almost ancient view of both former testimony and the Confrontation Clause, which
McCormick and the Supreme Court have soundly rejected. California v.
Green, 399 U.S. 149, 155 (1970); C. MCCORMICK, supra, § 254 at 614; 4 J. WEINSTEIN &M. BERGER, WEINSTEIN'S EVIDENCE § 800 [04], at 800-19 (1979). Yet it
is argued that the electronic deposition, like the new personal computer, is
"a tool for modern times," which allows for accurate preservation of evidence, testimony under oath, cross-examination, and demeanor evidence.
Some even speculate whether the right of confrontation was an attempt to
secure these guarantees of reliability in a pre-technological society. Parker,
Child Witnesses, supra note 2, at 695. Although the more psychologically
minded may still feel that the pre-technological requirement of face-to-face
confrontation with the defendant and jury adds an important dimension to
the reliability of testimony. See, e.g., United States v. Benfield, 593 F.2d 815
(8th Cir. 1979).
This argument, that videotaped depositions and interviews are just as
good as other forms of hearsay or even the trial process itself, confuses important considerations of public and judicial policy. These considerations
are clearly expressed in the Advisory Committee's note to the former testimony exception to the federal hearsay rule, which explains why former testimony, although highly reliable, is included under Rule 804 (declarant
unavailable) instead of Rule 803 (availability of declarant immaterial):
Former testimony does not rely upon some set of circumstances to substitute for oath and cross-examination, since both oath and opportunity
to cross-examine were present in fact. The only missing one of the
ideal conditions for the giving of testimony is the presence of the trier
and opponent ("demeanor evidence"). This is lacking with all hearsay
exceptions. Hence it may be argued that former testimony is the
strongest hearsay and should be included under Rule 803 .... However, opportunity to observe demeanor is what in a large measure confers depth and meaning upon oath and cross-examination .... In any
event, the tradition, founded in experience, uniformly favors production
of the witness if he is available. The exception indicates continuation of
the policy. This preference for the presence of the witness is apparent
also in rules and statutes on the use of depositions, which deal with
substantially the same problem.
FED. R. EVID. 804, Advisory Committee's Note, at 270 (West 1983).
Assessed against these policy interests, the argument that special child
depositions would be just as or reliable than other forms of hearsay seems
less cogent. Even the use of videotape, which would in part overcome the
absence of demeanor evidence, could probably not satisfy the policy preference for the presence of available witnesses. Any notion of psychological
unavailability would have to be carefully defined and limited to preserve
this policy. There is adequate precedent for using depositions for highly
traumatized and essentially unavailable witnesses such as rape victims. At
the other end of the continuum it is difficult to imagine a victim of any sexual or other violent crime who could not make a strong argument for "psychological unavailability.
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ual abuse. To assert that videotaped or closed-circuit
depositions are just as reliable as other admissible hearsay ignores the policy preference for the presence of available witnesses. The proper justification for admitting into evidence
specially taped child depositions and interviews is that the
strong public policy interest in protecting child victims of sexual
assault should be balanced against the strong public policy interest which favors the presence of available witnesses. Unfortunately, the Supreme Court, in its analysis and interpretation
of the Confrontation Clause, has left no possiblity of this kind of
"balancing test," except to assert, somewhat unconvincingly,
that a strict analysis of unavailability and indicia of reliability
will adequately accommodate all competing interests. 0 7 Moreover, the Court has been emphatic in declaring its intention not
to begin its Confrontation Clause analysis anew.10 8 Therefore, it
is not surprising that advocates of special depositions for child
victims of sexual abuse have felt the need to present their views
only in terms of the unavailability and reliability language of
Roberts.
There are several ironies that result from the Court's attempt to reconcile the hearsay doctrine with the Confrontation
Clause. One such irony involves the constitutional support that
the two hearsay proposals for child victims will probably receive. The Washington and Kansas statutes, which simply create a new hearsay exception, will probably be held
constitutional, although they lack all of the protections of live
testimony: oath, demeanor evidence and cross-examination.
On the other hand, the second proposal, which favors the use of
videotaped depositions and preserves all three of these conditions will probably receive less constitutional support.
Nick, Iron Shell AND Benfield
Two recent cases in the same federal circuit indicate how
differently the same court can approach Confrontation Clause
issues raised first, by a recognized exception to a hearsay rule,
and second, by a special closed-circuit, videotaped deposition.
Both cases are analogous to the two new hearsay proposals for a
child's statements for sexual abuse. United States v. Iron
Shell'0 9 involved hearsay admitted under established exceptions to the federal hearsay rule, but it was the kind of hearsay
that would be admitted under the new Washington and Kansas
107. See infra note 172 and accompanying text; see also Ohio v. Roberts,

448 U.S. 56, 65 (1980).
108. Roberts, 448 U.S. at 66 n.9.

109. 633 F.2d 77 (8th Cir. 1980).
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exceptions. United States v. Benfield" ° involved the use of videotaped depositions to protect a traumatized adult victim of
kidnapping.
John Louis Iron Shell was convicted of assault with intent to
rape a nine-year-old girl. Her statements after the assault to a
police officer were held admissible under the federal excited utterances exception,"' and her statements to a treating physician were held admissible under the federal medical treatment
exception. 112 The Eight Circuit 13 was willing to stretch the allowable time interval for an excited utterance considering the
child's age, physical and mental condition, the characteristics of
the event and the subject matter quoted. 114 Even though the
girl was available to testify, the defense raised a Confrontation
Clause objection which questioned whether the child was truly
available for effective cross-examination due to her young age.
The court held that even if the girl was thus "unavailable," the
admitted hearsay bore sufficient indicia of reliability to afford
the trier of fact a satisfactory basis for evaluating the truth of
the prior statement. 1 5 In so ruling, the Iron Shell court relied
heavily on the then very recent Supreme Court decision in Ohio
v. Roberts.
In the course of its opinion, the Iron Shell court also cited
United States v. Nick. 1 6 Nick is not as conceptually clear as
Iron Shell, but it is one of the few recent court of appeals cases
that deals directly with the issue of admitting a child's out-ofcourt statements of sexual abuse. In Nick, the victim was three
years old, and the victim's hearsay statement, as in Iron Shell,
was admitted under Federal Rule of Evidence 803 (2) and 803 (4).
The Nick court noted that the child was not subjected to crossexamination and could not have been due to his "extremely
tender years."" 7 In this pre-Roberts case, the court turned to
one of Roberts'predecessor, Dutton v. Evans,"8 to assess the reliability of the hearsay. The Nick court then went on to rely on
the criteria of the federal residual exception to accomplish the
task of determining whether the hearsay was sufficiently reliable. Using the residual exception criteria, the Nick court upheld
110. 593 F.2d 815 (8th Cir. 1979).
111. FED. R. EvD.803(2).
112. FED. R. Evi. 803(4).
113. United States v. Benfield, 633 F.2d 77, 86 (8th Cir. 1980).

114. Id.
115. Id. at 87.
116. 604 F.2d 1199 (9th Cir. 1979).

117. Id. at 1202.
118. 400 U.S. 74 (1970).
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the admission of the hearsay as highly reliable and probative. 119
Later in 1981, the same circuit in United States v. Perez120 found
the Nick court's reliance on Federal Rule of Evidence 803(24)
unjustified. Specifically, the residual exception requirement
that the statement be more probative on the point for which it is
offered than any other evidence seemed unnecessarily strict
under Dutton (and now Roberts). The Nick case has value, however, because it introduced the concept that a child, although
physically available to testify, may be "unavailable" due to cognitive limitations and perhaps even trauma. Iron Shell cites
Nick as representing the kind of case which poses a "special
type" of unavailability.121 Both cases may lend precedential
support to the notion of psychological unavailability, which is
thought to typify child sexual abuse.
Nick and Iron Shell involved "firmly rooted" 122 hearsay exceptions. Both courts found particularized indicia of reliability
under either Dutton or Roberts when there was a question as to
the victim's availability to testify. Neither court had any
problems upholding the admission of a child's out-of-court statements of sexual abuse over Confrontation Clause objections.
The question then remains whether the new Washington and
Kansas exceptions for child victims will receive the same level
of constitutional support. It also remains to be seen whether
courts will consider the new laws as "firmly rooted exceptions"
which provide the hearsay with an inherently high degree of reliability, or if they will require very particularized indicia of reliability. The standards for assessing these questions come from
Roberts, which was a prior testimony case that required very
particularized findings. The Roberts case itself may not be good
precedent for consideration of the Washington and Kansas laws
when compared to cases like Nick and Iron Shell. Although
these latter cases rely on traditional hearsay exceptions, the
hearsay which they allowed is very similar to the kind of hearsay which will be admitted under the new child sexual abuse
exceptions. While the constitutional criteria may come from the
language in Roberts, the Nick case and in particular, the Iron
Shell decision are more on point.
The Eighth Circuit decided Iron Shell in 1980. A year earlier
the same circuit had decided United States v. Benfield123 a case
which involved a closed-circuit taped deposition procedure for a
119.
120.
121.
122.

604 F.2d 1199, 1203 (9th Cir. 1979).
658 F.2d 654, 661 n. 6 (9th Cir. 1981).
United States v. Iron Shell, 633 F.2d 77, 87 (8th Cir. 1980).
Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 67 (1980) (excited utterances and state-

ments made to a treating physician).
123. 593 F.2d 815 (8th Cir. 1979).
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traumatized adult kidnap victim. The victim developed a pyschiatric "infirmity" following the ordeal and her treating psychiatrist indicated that she could not be subpoenaed for trial for
months. 124 The Government then filed a request for a videotaped deposition. The trial court granted the request and ordered that the defendant could be present at the deposition, but
not within the vision of the victim. During the deposition, the
defendant sat in another room and observed the proceedings on
a monitor. He was allowed to stop the questioning by sounding
a buzzer in order to consult with counsel. Counsel was allowed
to conduct cross-examination. The victim was kept unaware of
125
the defendant's presence in the building.
Despite these protections for the defendant, the court held
the procedure unconstitutional. The opinion in Benfield is perplexing because it appears to minimize modern Confrontation
Clause analysis while relying heavily on turn-of-the-century
case law. Note that Benfield is a pre-Roberts but a post-Mancusi
case. 126 While the court grudgingly acknowledged pre-Roberts
line of cases, it none the less relied primarily on a series of cases
decided between 1895 and 1911. The gist of the Benfield opinion
is that the necessity-reliability cases which ultimately led to
Roberts do not substantially mitigate the right to a "face-to-face"
confrontation between the witness and the accused. As the
Court stated:
Normally the right to confrontation includes a face-to-face meeting
at trial at which time cross-examination takes place ....
While
some recent cases use other language, none denies that confrontation required a face-to-face meeting in 1791 and none lessens the
force of the sixth amendment ....
While a deposition necessarily
eliminates a face-to-face meeting between witness and jury, we find
no justification for further abridgement of the defendant's rights. A
videotaped deposition supplies an environment substantially comparable to a trial, but where the defendant was not permitted to be
an active participant in the video
deposition, this procedural substi127
tute is constitutionally infirm.
The court must have placed great importance on the face-to-face
confrontation to have characterized the defendant in Benfield as
124. Id.
125. Id.
126. Mancusi v. Stubbs, 408 U.S. 204 (1972). The line of cases leading to
Roberts runs in the following order. Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400 (1965)
(applying the Confrontation Clause to the states through the due process
clause of the fourteenth amendment); Douglas v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 415
(1965); Barber v. Page, 390 U.S. 719 (1968); Bruton v. United States, 391 U.S.
123 (1968); California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149 (1970); Dutton v. Evans, 400 U.S.
74 (1970); Nelson v. O'Neill, 402 U.S. 622 (1971); Mancusi v. Stubbs, 408 U.S.
204 (1972); Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56 (1980).
127. Benfield, 593 F.2d at 821.
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unable to participate in the deposition, since he viewed the entire proceeding, could stop it at will and was able to assist his
attorney in the process of questioning and cross-examination.
The Benfield court indicated that any exception to direct
confrontation should be narrow in scope and based on necessity
or waiver.1 28 The Benfield court considered the possibility that a
defendant could commit a crime so heinous as to excuse the victim from face-to-face confrontation. 129
Thus, Benfield approached the concept of psychological unavailability by means
of a waiver theory. The court ruled, however, that the facts did
not involve conduct of that magnitude, and to find such a waiver
in this case would essentially destroy the right of confrontation
in nearly all cases of alleged crimes against persons. 130 Oddly,
the court did not, on the facts, find a showing of necessity, even
though a psychiatrist testified that the victim's mental infirmity
was directly related to the crime and rendered her unable to testify under normal trial conditions. The Benfield depositions procedure fell under Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure 15, which
relies for its definition of unavailability on Federal Rules of Evidence 804(a), the latter includes then existing physical or
mental illness or infirmity and thus seemingly applies to the
Benfield fact situation. Rule 15, however, also guarantees the
defendant the right to be in the presence of the witness during
the examination. 131 Although this provision is, in part, meant to
protect confrontation rights, the Benfield court was unclear in
stating whether its decision relied solely on Confrontation
Clause theory or on this specific provision of the applicable
rules of criminal procedure. The court did, however, specifically
refer to the right to face-to-face confrontation as a constitutional
right, even though it conceded that often necessary hearsay is
admitted despite the absence of confrontation with the accused. 32 The court indicated that it did favor the development
of electronic video technology which more nearly approximates
the traditional courtroom setting, specifically "face-to-face" confrontation with a witness who is aware of the defendant's
133
presence.
On its surface Benfield's analysis seems archaic and unenlightened in its interpretation of the Confrontation Clause. It
128. Id. at 821. For an example of a defendant's behavior acting as waiver

of confrontation rights, see United States v. Thevis, 665 F.2d 616 (5th Cir.

1982).
129. 593 F.2d at 821.
130. Id.
131. FED. R. CRIM. P. 15(b).
132. 593 F.2d at 819-21.
133. Id. at 821-22.
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minimizes the line of cases which led to Roberts just one year
later and instead, reaches back to the turn-of-the-century for
support of its literalistic reliance on "face-to-face" confrontation.
There appears to be a natural tension between Dutton, and Roberts on one hand, and Benfield on the other. The logical inconsistencies are apparent. Other less reliable hearsay is regularly
admitted with virtually no confrontation, participation of the defendant or cross-examination but Benfield requires a face-toface meeting for a psychologically unavailable witness who testifies under stringent standards of reliability and cross-examination. Although the Benfield court did not articulate the issue
clearly, if at all, it seemed to sense the differences between a
traditional hearsay exception and a deposition procedure intended to substitute for a part of the trial process. 134 The court
clearly did not view Benfield as a hearsay case, and seemed to
understand that a deposition implicates different policy values. 135 This may explain the court's repeated and apparently illogical insistence that none of the necessity-reliability cases
(like Dutton) deny that confrontation requires a "face-to-face"
meeting."' 3 6 Viewed this way, Benfield is a little less unenlightened and archaic. However, the Benfield court failed to
clearly articulate the different policy implications between depositions and other forms of hearsay. Various hearsay exceptions try to approximate conditions of reliability which
substitute for trial reliability, while depositions try to approximate conditions of the trial as a substitute for the trial itself.
This creates the irony that the policy preferences in taking depositions, such as requiring "face-to-face" confrontation are
stronger than the policy preferences in the trial itself, which repeatedly yield to adequate substitutes of reliability.
After considering the two new hearsay proposals for child
sexual abuse cases and analyzing Roberts, Nick, Iron Shell and
Benfield, there appears to be more constitutional support for
simply establishing a new hearsay exception for child reports of
sexual abuse than for establishing a new class of "child depositions." This result seems ironic because child deposition procedures place only minor limits on the defendant's rights to crossexamination and confrontation while other hearsay exceptions
provide no such protections other than certain "indicia of reliability." Yet this irony has already been played out within the
134. See supra text accompanying notes 45 to 167.
135. In one sense a deposition falls somewhere between a hearsay exception (in this case former testimony) and trial confrontation. The Benfield
court never discussed the deposition procedure as a hearsay issue and instead focused on the trial right of face-to-face confrontation. 593 F.2d at 821.

136. Id.
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same circuit of the United States court of appeals. 13 7
The Limits of the ConfrontationClause-And Other
Constitutional Rights
The introduction of hearsay at a criminal trial raises complex Confrontation Clause issues which have constituted the
bulk of the foregoing analysis. Actually, several clauses of the
United States Constitution are potentially implicated by the two
new hearsay proposals for child sexual abuse: the public trial,
compulsory process and confrontation clauses of the sixth
amendment, 138 the due process clauses of the fifth and fourteenth amendments 139 and the freedom of the press clause of
the first amendment. 14
While the relationship of the Confrontation Clause and the
Compulsory Process Clause makes for an interesting discussion, 141 the Supreme Court in its most recent hearsay doctrineConfrontation Clause cases has been unconcerned with the
Compulsory Process Clause. 142 The Compulsory Process
Clause would appear to guarantee the defendant a "right to put
on the stand a witness who was physically and mentally capable
of testifying to events that he had personally observed, and
whose testimony would have been relevant and material to the
defense."'143 Thus, defendants have a right to call available and
competent witnesses on material and relevant issues. The right
is not absolute, for example, there is no right of compulsory process when the witness is unavailable, as when he or she invokes
the fifth amendment right against self-incrimination, or otherwise refuses to testify.144 Perhaps one reason Confrontation
Clause analysis has not required an examinations of the Compulsory Process Clause is that, to date, the former has required
a strong showing of unavailability, which would seem to satisfy
the latter. Parker, a strong advocate of taped child testimony,
concedes that to automatically disqualify all children from testifying to a certain type of crime would "run afoul" of the Compul137. Compare United States v. Benfield, 593 F.2d 815 (8th Cir. 1979) with
United States v. Iron Shell, 633 F.2d 77 (8th Cir. 1980).
138. U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
139. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.
140. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
141. See Westen, Confrontationand Compulsory Process: A Unified Theory of Evidence for Criminal Cases, 91 HARv. L. REV. 567 (1978).
142. See Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56 (1980).
143.
144.
States
(1975);

Washington v. Texas, 388 U.S. 14, 23 (1967).
See, e.g., Washington v. Texas, 388 U.S. 14, 23 n.21 (1967); United
v. Roberts, 503 F.2d 598, 600 (9th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1113
Myers v. Frye, 401 F.2d 18, 21 (7th Cir. 1968).
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sory Process Clause. However, Parker suggests that a courtappointed attorney charged with protecting the rights of the
child victim could invoke the privilege not to testify on behalf of
an individual child. 145 Much will depend on how courts respond
to the argument that a child victim is "psychologically unavailable" and what circumstances will constitute a showing of psychological unavailability.
These new child hearsay proposals may also affect the public nature of the trial process. Under the sixth amendment, the
defendant has a right to a public trial' 4 6 and under present first
amendment law, the public and press have a right of access to
criminal trials. 147 Special procedures which protect the child by
limiting access to the courtroom may affect these rights. However, these rights are not absolute. There seems to be adequate
precedent for curtailing the defendant's right to a public trial in
order to protect the psychological well-being of victim-witnesses. 148 In fact, some states have enacted legislation which
149
excludes the general public from trials for certain sex crimes.
150
The leading case, Globe Newspaper Co. v. Superior Court, is
discussed in the next section of this article which explores the
Court's different approaches to protecting child victims under
the first and the sixth amendments.' 5 ' One recognized generalization about the Supreme Court's resolution of right to trial issues is that the Court seems more willing to resolve the
competing interests of the defendant and the press by means of
a balancing test. 52 Confrontation Clause analysis, however, although referring to competing interests, is either more literalistic and absolutist, or relies on traditional hearsay analysis such
as the Roberts necessity and reliability criteria. 53 This difference in interpretation raises the question of whether the most
effective and constitutionally acceptable way to protect children
154
is by clearing the courtroom or taking a special deposition.
145. Parker, Child Witnesses, supra note 2, at 704.
146. U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
147. Globe Newspaper Co. v. Superior Ct., 457 U.S. 596, 604 (1982).
148. Id. at 606-07; see also Parker, Child Witnesses, supra note 2, at 712-16.
149. See statutes collected in 6 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT COMMON LAW § 1835 at 449 n.3 (1976). But see MASS. GEN. LAws ANN. ch. 278

§ 16A (West 1972) which was held unconstitutional in Globe Newspaper Co.
v. Superior Ct., 457 U.S. 596 (1982).
150. 457 U.S. 596 (1982).
151. See supra text accompanying notes 67 to 167.
152. See Globe Newspaper Co. v. Superior Ct., 457 U.S. 596 (1982).
153. Roberts, 448 U.S. at 66.
154. Ghent, Victim Testimony in Sex Crime Prosecutions:An Analysis of
the Rape Shield Provision and the Use of Deposition Testimony Under the
Criminal Sexual Conduct Statute, 34 S. C. L. REV. 583, 588-93 n.29 (1982).
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Although these other clauses of the sixth amendment are
conceivably relevant to the new hearsay proposals for child sexual abuse, the Supreme Court, in its own analysis of the hearsay-Confrontation Clause aggregate, has not felt the need to
address these issues. The foregoing analysis has therefore primarily involved the Confrontation Clause. It should be
remembered, however, that the Clause reads: "In all criminal
prosecution, the accused shall enjoy the right . . .to be confronted with the witnesses against him. . . ,,"15
The Clause does
not apply to civil cases involving child abuse and neglect heard
before juvenile or family courts. 156 This is an important distinction because most cases of child sexual abuse, for various reasons, do not reach criminal trial. 157 One could easily argue that
loss of fundamental rights resulting from a termination of parental rights for abuse is far more serious than many potential criminal penalties, yet to date the Court has extended confrontation
rights only to proceedings in which the juvenile is subject to loss
of liberty. 5 8 By reason of these limits upon the Confrontation
Clause, many of the reforms discussed in this article may be
more easily implemented in civil proceedings 5 9 as long as due
process protections are preserved.
One issue that has occasionally occupied the Court in the
course of its Confrontation Clause analysis is the relationship
between the Due Process Clause and the Confrontation Clause.
Justice Harlan, in his concurring opinion in California v.
Green, 60 clouded this relationship when he suggested that the
Confrontation Clause requires the presence of available witnesses, while the Due Process Clause acts to bar convictions
based on unreliable testimony.' 6' In Dutton v. Evans,162 Justice
155. U.S.

CONST.

amend. VI.

156. Actually the Supreme Court has not addressed the specific issue of
whether the Confrontation Clause applies in civil trials for child abuse and

neglect. However the Court has recently declined to extend other sixth
amendment protections to juvenile and family courts. See Lassiter v. De-

partment of Social Servs., 452 U.S. 18, 37 (1981) (appointment of counsel is
not consitutionally required in every case involving termination of parental
rights); McKeiver v. Pennsylvania, 403 U.S. 528 (1971) (extending the right

to jury trial to all juvenile actions is not constitutionally required and would
effectively end the unique nature of the juvenile process).
157. C. Rogers, Child Sexual Abuse and the Courts: EmpiricalFindings,

Paper Presented at the Annual Convention of the American Psychological

Association, Montreal, Canada, September, 1980 (Child Protection Center
Special Unit, Children's Hospital, National Medical Center, Washington,

D.C.).
158. See In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 13 (1967).

159.
160.
161.
162.

See, e.g., N.Y. FAM.CT. ACT. § 1046(a)(vi) (McKinney 1983).
339 U.S. 149 (1970).
Id. at 179-89 (Harlan J., concurring).
400 U.S. 74, 96-97 (1970).
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Harlan, in another concurring opinion, recanted his Confrontation Clause-due process dichotomy. 163 He suggested that the
Confrontation Clause was "simply not well designed for taking
into account the numerous factors that must be weighed in passing on the appropriateness of rules of evidence .... The task is
far more appropriately performed under the aegis of the Fifth
and Fourteenth Amendments ....",164 Both of Justice Harlan's
theories have received some support from commentators but
were rejected by the Roberts court. 65 Roberts solves the confusion by suggesting that the Confrontation Clause requires both
necessity and reliability.
In terms of the necessity/unavailability and reliability/trustworthiness criteria of Roberts, Justice Harlan first attributed the reliability issue to the Due Process Clause and the
unavailability issue to the Confrontation Clause. 166 Then in
Dutton he rejected the unavailability requirement as too strict
and relied on the Due Process Clause only. 167 The Roberts
court, on the other hand, interpreted the requirements for unavailability and reliability as both emanating from the Confrontation Clause and did not discuss the due process clause.
Roberts' analysis is neither surprising nor radical since it basically relies on an "evidentiary" approach to the Confrontation
Clause; necessity and trustworthiness have always been requirements for hearsay exceptions under the common law.
Such an evidentiary approach does not require any analysis of
the Due Process Clause, and, in fact, predates both the Confrontation Clause and the Due Process Clause.
IV.

THE PROBLEM OF AN EVIDENTIARY APPROACH TO A
CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT

To this point, the constitutionality of the two new hearsay
proposals for child sexual abuse cases has been assessed on the
basis of case law, specifically the leading case of Ohio v. Roberts.168 This approach seemed sensible because both proposals
relied primarily on Roberts. Roberts was clearly intended to represent a forceful consolidation and clarification of the Court's
Confrontation Clause theory and to quell the wide divergence of
scholarly commentary. 169 However, the problem of child sexual
163. Id.
164. Id.
165. 448 U.S. 56, 67 n.9 (1980).
166. See supra note 160.

167. See supra note 162.
168. 448 U.S. 56 (1980).
169. Id. at 67 n.9.
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abuse raises such a salient public policy issue that it highlights a
fundamental flaw in the Supreme Court's attempt to reconcile
the hearsay doctrine with the Confrontation Clause. This is a
difficult point to underscore conceptually due to the long jurisprudential history by which the constitutional right of confrontation has come to be interpreted by means of an essentially
evidentiary analysis based on the common law. That analysis
utilizes the criteria of necessity and reliability as set forth in
Roberts. As long as the Supreme Court continues to rely upon
its common-law approach to the sixth amendment, it will be difficult to protect sexually abused children within our legal
system.
In a well reasoned article, Howard Gutman noted the significant discrepancies between the Court's approach to the Confrontation Clause and other constitutional rights:
All scholars and courts agree that the right of confrontation like all
rights, cannot be absolute. However, despite the evolution of the
various tests developed in constitutional jurisprudence to mediate
rights and government interests, in the past eighty-one years no
test has been formulated or identified to accommodate the right to
confrontation and the state's countervailing interest... no scholar
or judge has ever suggested reliance on the compelling state interest test to assess the constitutional validity of abridgements of the
right of confrontation. Even conceding arguendo that the right of
confrontation is less fundamental than other interests, no court or
writer has ever applied the minimum rationality test, currently employed in mediating the state's interest with regard to less fundamental interests. Rather, since the time of Wigmore, the mediation
of the government's interest and the guarantee of confrontation has
been achieved, sub silentio,by reliance on the terms 'necessity' and
'reliability' to redefine the scope of the protection provided by the
clause to conform to the requirements of the laws of evidence....
The inconsistency between the mode of mediation employed with
regard to most constitutional rights and that relied on in confrontation cases is generally unrecognized. Where it is recognized, it is
tolerated by jurists and scholars because of the different perspective from which the rights are viewed, and from which the tests
were formulated. Constitutional rights today are viewed as existing by virtue of their inclusion in the Bill of Rights; their meaning is interpreted either by reference to the text of the Constitution
alone, or as informed by changing social norms and values. Therefore, rights can be limited only by compelling and well-tailored
states' interests. In contrast, the right to confrontation exists as an
added rule of evidence whose scope has been defined with reference to pre-existing law of evidence, by the same balance of factors
170
(reliability and necessity) that shape all rules of admissibility.
While acknowledging that it would be a "gross overstatement" to blame one man's personal views for the present state
170. Gutman, supra note 102, at 344.
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of confusion and inconsistency, Gutman nevertheless accused
Wigmore, 171 whose minimization and misinterpretation of the
Confrontation Clause has been well-documented and explicitly
rejected by the Supreme Court. 172 Ironically, while the
Supreme Court consciously rejects Wigmore's limited view of
the Confrontation Clause, the Court nonetheless is unconsciously influenced by the powerful Wigmorean legacy which initially subjected the Confrontation Clause to common-law rules
of evidentiary admissibility.
Although Gutman's article was published in 1981,173 it appears to have been drafted prior to the Ohio v. Roberts decision. 174 Gutman's analysis relied on Dutton v. Evans, 75 but it is
equally applicable to Roberts. This in part confirms Gutman's
hypotheses. Interestingly, the court used language in Roberts
which suggested that it was aware of the need to balance confrontation rights against competing societal interests:
The Court, however has recognized that competing interests, if
closely examined... may warrant dispensing with confrontation
at trial. . . (general rules of law of this kind, however beneficient in
their operation and valuable to the accused, must occasionally give
way to considerations of public policy and the necessities of the
This Court, in a series
case) ....
176of cases, has sought to accommodate these competing interests.
Immediately thereafter, however, the Court launched into a definition of the key words of its opinion: necessity and reliability.1 77 Apparently the Court was implying that all competing
societal interests were automatically balanced solely by reliance
on the pre-constitutional criteria of necessity and reliability.
The problem of child sexual abuse underscores the inadequacy of using a common-law, evidentiary approach to interpret
a clause of the United States Constitution. Advocates of new
hearsay proposals to protect child sex abuse victims must go to
absurd lengths to reconcile their proposals with the reasoning in
Roberts. They have to establish the notion of "psychological unavailability" for victims who may be available to testify and who
may be psychologically sound. In many cases "psychological
171. Id. at 340.

172. Dutton v. Evans, 400 U.S. 74, 86 (1970) ("It seems apparent that the
Sixth Amendment's Confrontation Clause and the evidentiary hearsay rule
stems from the same roots; California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149, 155 (1970). But
this Court has never equated the two and we decline to do so now."). See
also 4 J. WEINSTEIN & M. BERGER, WEINSTEIN's EVIDENCE § 800[04] at 800-19

(1979).
173.
174.
175.
176.
177.

Gutman, supra note 102.
448 U.S. 56 (1980).
400 U.S. 74 (1970).
448 U.S. at 65.
Id. at 66.
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unavailability" will only mean relying on the language of Roberts to express the thought. We should not require testimony
from a limited class of traumatized child victims due to the competing societal interest in protecting all child victims of sexual
abuse. Benfield suggests that any special deposition designed to
protect the child victim must resemble live testimony so closely
that the protections afforded the child are minimal. 178 However,
due to the wording of Roberts, advocates of these deposition proposals feel they must go to great lengths to make the obvious
argument that depositions are "just as reliable" as other forms
of hearsay. 179 The problem of the Court's evidentiary approach
to the Confrontation Clause may also complicate implimentation of a new hearsay exception for child reports of sexual
abuse, similar to the laws of Washington and Kansas. 8 0 Those
statutes contain the unavailability/reliability language of Roberts. Is this really the purpose of a hearsay exception and is this
approach much better than a residual or catch-all exception approach? 18 1 The Court's present approach to the Confrontation
Clause seems too limited to allow for the progressive growth of
the hearsay doctrine in response to newly identified social issues and our expanding knowledge of the human condition. We
are left with a variety of "firmly rooted", 82 archaic, unreliable
hearsay exceptions. 183 Those exceptions receive almost unquestioned constitutional support. At the same time, new forms
of reliable hearsay, which serve significant societal interests, are
admitted on essentially a case-by-case basis.
The inconsistencies between the Court's approach to the
is
Confrontation Clause and other clauses of the Bill of Rights 184
demonstrated in Globe Newspaper Co. v. Superior Court.
Globe raised the issue of protecting a child victim of sexual assault within the legal system. Globe was, however, a first
amendment case involving a Massachusetts statute. The Massachusetts statute required the exclusion of the press and public
from the courtroom during the testimony of victims at trials for
specified sexual offenses involving victims under the age of
eighteen. 85 The Globe Newspaper Company challenged the
178. 593 F.2d 815 (8th Cir. 1979).
179. Proving Parent-ChildIncest, supra note 8, at 137-38; see also note 70
and accompanying text.
180. See supra text accompanying notes 10 to 66.
181. See supra text accompanying notes 10 to 44.

182. Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 67 (1980).
183. E. CLEARY, MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE § 261 at 625-26 (2d ed. 1972)
(comparing questionable reliability of traditional exceptions with the high
reliability of prior testimony).
184. 457 U.S. 596 (1982).
185. MAss. GEN. LAws ANN., ch. 278 § 16A (West 1972).
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trial court's barring of the press and public from the courtroom
under this statute. Using language typical of first amendment
interpretation, the Court held the statute unconstitutional. The
right of access to criminal trials was found to be of "constitutional stature" but not absolute. 186 Any state limitation on the
press and public's right of access must be a "weighty one" based
on a "compelling governmental interest," and must be "narrowly
tailored" to serve that interest. 187 The Court objected to the
Massachusetts statute because the statute's mandatory-closure
rule was overbroad and not tailored to serve the compelling
state interest of safeguarding the physical and psychological
well being of child victims of sexual assault. 188 In a forceful dissenting opinion, the Chief Justice deplored the Court's holding. 8 9 He noted that minors charged with rape are
automatically insulated from the press, while minors who are
victims of rape do not even have the right to mandatory courtroom closure while they testify. 190 The Chief Justice's opinion is
also noteworthy for its strong reliance on "psychological" and
"empirical" evidence to support his contention that the experience of open courtroom testimony can leave "devastating and
permanent scars" on victims of sexual assault.' 9 '
Globe is a controversial case that has stimulated much commentary; 192 however, all of the justices, including the Chief Justice, agreed on the same principle of interpretation.
The
mandatory closure order infringed on the first amendment right
to public access to criminal trials, while at the same time represented a compelling state interest in protecting child victims of
sexual assault. The only real issue was whether the mandatory
closure order was narrow enough to serve the compelling state
interest. If the fact situation in Globe was altered so as to transform it into a hearsay-Confrontation Clause case, the result
might have been different.
Suppose, for example, a victim had been so traumatized as
to be unable to testify and that the victim might have made
statements to a specially trained police investigator who had interviewed him ninety minutes after the attack, and the prosecution might have sought to admit those statements into evidence
186.
187.
188.
189.
190.
191.

Globe Newspaper Co. v. Superior Court, 457 U.S. 596, 602 (1982).
Id.
Id. at 603.
Id. at 605.
Id.
Id. at 603.

192. Melton, A Psycholegal Dilemma, supra note 3; Parker, Child Witnesses Versus The Press: A ProposedLegislative Response to Globe v. Superior Court, 47 ALB. L. REV. 408 (1983).
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under the hearsay exception. Instead of considering the balance
between the constitutional right to confrontation and the compelling state interest in protecting the victim, the court would
instead immediately turn to a consideration of the unavailability
and reliability criteria of Roberts. First, there would probably be
a long analysis of whether the victim-witness was actually available. The court would have to define "psychological unavailability" and determine its limits. There would be a consideration of
the prosecution's "good faith" efforts to establish the unavailability of the witness. Regardless of the Confrontation Clause issues, some exception to the hearsay rule would have to exist to
admit into evidence the out-of-court declaration made to the police investigator. The prosecution would have to find an exception such as the excited utterance exception. The defense
would argue that ninety minutes was too long of a time for the
statement to qualify as an excited utterance. The prosecution
would then have the officer testify to the child's distraught state,
her disheveled hair and clothes, and the blood and bruises. If a
traditional exception could not be found, the prosecution would
rely on a residual exception, if one was available in that jurisdiction. If a residual exception applied, the prosecution would have
to establish that the hearsay was more probative than any other
evidence. 193 The trial court would then have to find particularized indicia of reliability, and decide whether the hearsay was to
be admitted under a traditional exception, a residual exception
or a special child sexual abuse exception. The court would have
no real standards on which to base its decision. It might decide
to interview the victim privately, it might require corroborating
evidence, or it might ask the investigating police officer to testify
as to the reliability of the child's report based on the officer's
training in child sexual abuse investigations. This would, however, create the problem of asking the witness to assess the reliability of the hearsay statement the witness is about to utter.
This hypothetical case emphasizes how differently the
Supreme Court would interpret the right to confrontation compared to other constitutional rights such as those involved in
Globe. Arguably, the first and sixth amendments should be interpreted differently because they represent different constitutional rights. 194 Nonetheless, the comparison between the two
amendments underscores how unresponsive present Confronta193. See, e.g.,

FED. R. EvID. 804(b)(5)(B).

194. This argument however can quickly become circular, because to rely
on the common law roots of the Confrontation Clause, is to ignore the constitutional issue. That constitutional issue is more properly viewed as
whether the Confrontation Clause solely serves the instrumental end of facilitating the admission of probative and reliable evidence, or whether the
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tion Clause analysis is to newly identified competing societal interests. The tone of the Roberts opinion suggests that the Court
is not about to change its approach to the Confrontation Clause.
For the present, it appears that the compelling state interest in
protecting child victims of sexual abuse can only be achieved by
stretching the evidentiary concepts of necessity and reliability
beyond their original and intended meanings.
Do the Assumptions Underlying the Hearsay Rule and
Confrontation Clause Apply to Child Victims of
Sexual Abuse?
The legal principles of cross-examination, hearsay and the
right to confrontation were developed at a time when children
were generally regarded as incompetent witnesses. 195 Emphasis on the basis of the hearsay rule today tends to focus on the
condition of cross-examination. 196 The solution developed
under the common law was that certain guarantees of trustworthiness or reliability were required to compensate for the great
disadvantage of not subjecting the hearsay declarant to crossexamination. The hearsay doctrine and the Confrontation
197
Clause are said to protect similar but not identical interests.
In Roberts, the Supreme Court held that a primary interest secured by the Confrontation Clause is the right to crossexamination. 198
These assumptions are simply not valid when the hearsay
declarant is a child victim of sexual abuse. Child reports of sexual abuse are inherently reliable and often have the "ring of verity" which only a child could utter.199 A young victim of sexual
abuse who is cross examined in court with the defendant (who
right to confrontation protects intrinsic value. See, e.g., L.

TaBE, AMERICAN

CONSTrrUTIONAL LAW § 10-7, 12-1 (1978); Gutman, supra note 102, at 347.

195. The modern trend is to admit the testimony of children, leaving the

question of the weight and credibility of the testimony to the jury. See, e.g.,

FED. R. EviD. 601, Advisory Committee's Note, at 203 (West 1983). In most
states the rule for assessing competency of a child witness is established by

case law. In states with statutory guidelines, often children above age 10

are presumed competent and children under 10 are presumed incompetent.

However these presumptions are usually rebutable. Courts have held chil-

dren as young as four years old competent to testify. United States v. Iron
Shell, 633 F.2d 77, 87 (8th Cir. 1980). But it should be remembered that even
a young competent witness maybe too young to be fully confronted and
cross-examined by a defendant exercising her or his Confrontation Clause
rights. See United States v. Iron Shell, 633 F.2d 77, 87 (8th Cir. 1980). See
generally Melton, Children's Competency, supra note 29, at 73 n.1.
196. 5 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 1367, at 29 (1972).
197. Ohio v. Roberts, 488 U.S. 56, 64 (1980).
198. Id. at 64.
199. See infra text accompanying notes 67-167. United States v. Iron
Shell, 633 F.2d 77 (8th Cir. 1980); United States v. Nick, 604 F.2d 1199 (9th Cir.
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may be a family member) present, may appear to be unreliable
even though the victim is telling the truth.200 Guilt, fear, trauma,
cognitive immaturity, and "incest dynamics" may all undermine
the child's ability to testify effectively. 20 1 In contrast, the child is
much more likely to provide a reliable account when interviewed and videotaped in a playroom by a specially trained
child abuse investigator who understands child psychology and
who uses dolls to facilitate the child's description of the incident. The difference between these two situations is the difference between obtaining truth from an adult and obtaining truth
from a frightened child. Naturally, the latter procedure is more
humane and better serves the compelling societal interest in
protecting child victims of sexual assault. However, the focus
here is not to further these interests but rather to better serve
the stated purpose of the hearsay doctrine and the Confrontation Clause, which is to further the interests of justice by providing the trier of fact with only the most reliable forms of
evidence.
Our present knowledge of child psychology and child sexual
abuse indicates that a child's hearsay report of sexual abuse will
2 02
often be more reliable than the child's courtroom testimony.
In such a paradoxical situation, the right to confrontation and
cross-examination may not further the interests of justice nor
protect the truth-seeking process. If we must use the "necessity" and "reliability" criteria as present Confrontation Clause
analysis requires us to do, then "reliability" should be viewed as
a double edged sword. When child victims of sexual abuse are
involved, the inherent reliability of the hearsay report should be
balanced against the inherent reliability or unreliability of the
child's ability to testify effectively. This type of "balancing test"
will yield a different result depending on the interpretation of
the Confrontation Clause.
V.

THE RELIABILIrY AND NECESSrrY OF NEW HEARSAY

EXCEPTIONS

FOR SEXUALLY ABUSED CHILDREN

This article has focused on the Confrontation Clause
keywords of necessity and reliability to assess the constitutionality of two new proposals for admitting into evidence a child's
1979); Lancaster v. People, 200 Colo. 448, 452, 615 P.2d 720, 723 (1980); Love v.
State, 64 Wis. 2d 432, 442, 219 N.W.2d 294, 299 (1974).
200. Love v. State, 64 Wis. 2d 432, 434, 219 N.W.2d 294, 299 (1974); C. ADAMS
& J. FAY, No MORE SECRETS 63 (1981); Melton, ProceduralReforms, supra
note 3.
201. See supratext accompanying notes 168 to 202.
202. Melton, ProceduralReforms, supranote 3, at 189.
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prior statements of sexual abuse. In this section, these legal
keywords will be used to organize a discussion of the available
psychological evidence which may lend support to these two
hearsay proposals. However, an important caveat is in order for
those unfamiliar with empirical methodology.
One of the most unfortunate impediments to the conceptual
integration of law and psychology has been the senseless controversy over the applicability of empirical social science research to legal issues. The justices of the Supreme Court have
at times scorned the use of "numerology derived from statistical
studies," 20 3 and deplored "the judicial equivalent of a doctoral
examination" in social science methods. 20 4 Social scientists
generally view the Court's intuitive skepticism of empirical research as unfortunate, ignorant, and totally unscientific. 20 5
However, when the Court does rely on empirical data, the same
social scientists point out that the data has been misapplied,
20 6
misinterpreted and is full of methodogical flaws.
203. Ballew v. Georgia, 435 U.S. 223, 246 (1978).
204. Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 224 (1976) (Rehnquist,

J., dissenting).

205. Meehl, Law and the Fireside Inductions: Some Reflections of a
Clinical Psychologist,27 J. Soc. ISSUES 65 (1971).
206. Melton, A Psycholegal Dilemma, supra note 3. Each profession, law
and psychology, relies on different epistemological methods. Professor
Paul Meehl, one of the leading pioneers in modern clinical psychology research, characterizes the legal method as one of "fireside inductions" (common sense, ancedotal introspective, and culturally transmitted beliefs
about human behavior). Meehl, supra note 205, at 65. Layman, lawyer's
and psychologist's method of human understanding, while often effective,
contains considerable sources of error. However, Professor Meehl notes
that the empirical, statistical methods of social scientists "are plagued with
methodological" problems which often render their generalized conclusions
equally dubious. Meehl, supra note 205, at 65. Fireside inductions can result in broad conclusions about the most complex human behavior but lack
empirical support and are often untestable. See generally Meehl, supra
note 205. Empirical research, on the other hand, is usually limited to the
specific controlled conditions of the experiment. Causal relationships between variables are rarely absolutely established but instead must be inferred from only statistical correlations.
Meehl, Theoretical Risks and
Tabular Asterisks: Sir Karl, Sir Ronald, and the Slow Process of Psychology, 46 J. CONSULTING & CUN. Psy. 806 (1978) [hereinafter cited as Meehl,
Progress of Psychology]. See also Meehl, supra note 205, at 65. Even if a
causal relationship can be clearly established, the conditions of the experiment must be so closely controlled and defined that the empirical results
cannot be generalized to to other "Real-World" situations. Most empirical
research regarding complex human behavior, although "scientific in
method," is often inconclusive. Consequently, the concluding platitude of
many a social science research article is "that we need more research."
Meehl, supra note 205, at 96. Interestingly, many of the most influential psychological theories are themselves more like fireside inductions than modern day empirical research. Meehl notes that the possible irony that
modern psycholanalytic theories fall under this definition of fireside inductions, but he avoids taking a stand on this issue and instead chooses to highlight the differences between the law and empirical psychology. See Meehl,
supra note 205, at 66. See also, Meehl, Progressof Psychology, supra at 829-
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Is A New Hearsay Exception For Child Sexual Abuse
"Necessary?"
One of the primary rationales for the new hearsay proposals
is that most child victims are psychologically unavailable to testify, and that they would be traumatized and psychologically
damaged by the experience of having to recount sexual abuse
under normal courtroom conditions. The debate over this assumption recently reached the Supreme Court in Globe Newspaper Co. v. Superior Court. 2 07 In Globe the Court concluded
that there was insufficient "empirical support" for the state's
mandatory courtroom closure rule to protect child victims of
sexual assault. In his dissenting opinion, the Chief Justice characterized the Court's search for empirical evidence as a "cavalier disregard of the reality of human experience. '' 20 8 However,
the Chief Justice cites six authorities in support of his contention that for a child victim the ordeal of testifying in an open
' 209
courtroom could "be devastating and leave permanent scars.
Globe underscores the debate between empiricism and fireside inductionism. It also serves as a reminder that neither approach can establish with absolute scientific certainty that most
child victims of sexual assault are psychologically damaged by
the experience of testifying. Even a rather obvious truth based
on the "reality of human experience" is difficult to scientifically
prove. One such assertion is that, "the majority of survivors of
commercial jetliner disasters are psychologically but perhaps
unconsciously scarred by the experience. '2 10 The present methodological obstacles to measuring such long-term, unconscious
and complex human reactions are simply too numerous. The assertion that child victims are permanently harmed by their
courtroom experience may similarly be one of these obvious but
empirically unprovable truths based on the "reality of human
experience."
Despite this debate, a growing body of empirical data, case
studies and increasingly sophisticated "fireside inductions",
however, suggests that child sexual assault victims are in fact
traumatized by the experience of testifying, regardless of
whether they are victims of a violent sexual assault or a non31. Freud's theory of the oedipal complex, for example, is essentially untestable and derived from his "fireside induction" that his empirical results
could not possibly be true.
207. 457 U.S. 596 (1982).

208. Id. at 608.
209. Id. at 608-09.
210. Meehl, Progressof Psychology, supra note 205.
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violent molestation. 2 11 While good empirical studies are
scarce, 212 many experts draw their conclusions from case studies and their experience in working with sex abuse victims and
their families. These case study conclusions, while lacking empirical validity, are based on clinical experience. They fall somewhere between an empirical study and a simple fireside
induction. 2 13 Some commentators object to these conclusions as
premature. They note the scarcity of good empirical studies, as
well as the fact that child sexual abuse is typically "non-violent"
and therefore not analogous to the experience of adult rape victims. 21 4 Some commentators even hypothesize that at least for
some children the experience of testifying may be cathartic,
may provide a means of emotionally taking control of the situation and may help achieve a sense of vindication. 2 15 However, at
present, such hypotheses also lack empirical support and only
serve as competing untested theories.
New hearsay exceptions for child reports of sexual abuse
are also necessary because of the frequency with which children
falsely retract their stories of abuse or refuse to cooperate once
the criminal prosecution has commenced. 2 16 A child may retract
the report out of fear, guilt, shame, or self-blame. In cases of
incest, even more pressures on the child to retract the report
exist. If the child is removed from the home for protection, the
child may feel punished and lonely. If the child is kept in the
211. See E. HIBERMAN, THE RAPE VICTIM 53-54 (1976); S. KATZ & MAZUR,
UNDERSTANDING THE RAPE VICTIM: A SYNTHESIS OF RESEARCH FINDINGS
1982-2000 (1979); SEXUAL ASSAULT OF CHILDREN AND ADOLESCENTS, supra

note 3; Katz, supranote 10, at 91-96; Melton, ProceduralReforms, supra note
3; Proving Parent-ChildIncest, supra note 8.
212. But see Burgess & Holmstrom, The Child and the Family in the Court
Process, SEXUAL ASSAULT OF CHILDREN AND ADOLESCENTS (A. Burgess, A.

Groth, L. Holmstrom & S. Sgrois eds. 1978); DEFRANCIS, PROTECTING THE
CHILD VICTIM OF SEX CRIMES COMMITTED BY ADULTS (American Humane
Association 1969).

213. Such techniques include interviewing victims, see Burgess & Holmstrom, supra note 212, and the clinical observations of psychotherapists who
treat the victims and help them deal with the experience of testifying. For
the opinions of judges who regularly assess the state of such victim-witnesses see Bohmar, JudicialAttitudes Toward Rape Victims, 57 JUDICATURE
303, 306 (1974) (reporting a survey of judges' perceptions of the traumatic
effects of testimony).
214. Melton, A PsycholegalDilemma, supra note 3. But see Glove Newspaper Co. v. Superior Ct., 457 U.S. 596, 608 n.7 (1982) (Burger, J., dissenting)

("Holmstrom and Burgess report that nearly half of all adult rape victims
were disturbed by the public setting of their trials. Certainly the impact on
children must be greater."). Id.
215. Melton, A Psycholegal Dilemma, supra note 3; Rogers, supra note
157.
216. Love v. States, 64 Wis. 2d 432, 442, 219 N.W.2d 294, 299 (1974); Goodwin, Sahd & Rada, Incest Hoax: False Accusations, False Denials, 6 BULL
AM. ACAD. PSYCHIATRY &LAw 269 (1978) [hereinafter cited as Incest Hoax].
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home and the offender is removed, the child may feel responsible and guilty for causing the offender to be taken away. The
child may also have to deal with the mixed feelings of other family members. Many children fear that participation in the process of legal intervention, could cause the offender to be sent to
prison. In cases of incest, the child victim may have mixed feelings toward the offender. By making the report, most children
are simply asking for their parents to love them in the right
way. 2 17 Pre-trial recantations of sexual abuse can be considered
a typical reaction which is congruent with a pattern of in2 18
trafamilial sexual abuse.
Admitting hearsay reports of child abuse is also considered
necessary because many victims are simply too young to be
available as witnesses due to their cognitive immaturity. Even if
the prosecution is willing to put such a vulnerable witness on
the stand, the defense may claim that the child is too young to
be subjected to effective cross-examination and trial confrontation.2 19 While the modern trend is to admit the testimony of
sexual
abuse are so
younger children, 220 many child victims of 22
1
young that they are incompetent to testify.

A final reason that such hearsay exceptions are necessary is
that the sexual abuse cases are difficult to prosecute. Often the
only witnesses to the event are the offender and the child victim. 222 Corroborating physical evidence may be inconclusive or
non-existent, depending on the type of sexual abuse. 223 Under
217. Because of the complex dynamics of infrafamilial sexual abuse chil-

dren may have mixed feelings about the abuse because the offender inappropriately uses sexual contact to give the child a measure of affection,

attention and importance; most children continue to want these things-but

without the sexual contact. See Katz, supra note 10, at 88; Lloyd, supra note

12, at 112; K. MacFarlane, Sexual Abuse of Children,in THE SEXUAL VICTIMi-

94-96 (J. Chapman & M. Gates eds. 1978).
218. State v. Middleton, 294 Or. 427, 657 P.2d 1215 (1983); Berliner, Blick
and Bulkley, Expert Testimony on the Dynamics of Intra-FamilialChild
Sexual Abuse and the Principles of Child Development, in CHILD SEXUAL
ZATION OF WOMEN

ABUSE AND THE LAw, supra note 2; S. Mele-Sernovitz, Parental Sexual

Abuse of Children. The Law as a Therapeutic Tool For Families,in LEGAL
REPRESENTATION OF THE MALTREATED CHILD 70 (1979) (describing the "sexually abused child syndrome"). See Defiance, TIME, Jan. 23, 1984, at 35 (reporting a highly publicized case in which a judge sent a twelve year old
incest victim to solitary confinement until she would agree to testify against

her father).
219. United States v. Iron Shell, 633 F.2d 77, 87 (8th Cir. 1980).
220. See infra note 221 and accompanying text.
221. Many victims are two or three years old or younger. See, e.g., United
States v. Nick, 604 F.2d 1199, 1202 (9th Cir. 1979) (victim-witness in case of
child sexual abuse "could not have been subjected to cross-examination
...by reason of his extremely tender years").
222. See supra text accompanying notes 10 to 44.
223. See Lloyd, supra note 12.
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such conditions, the ability to consider a child's prior report of
the incident may provide the trier of fact with necessary and
highly probative evidence.
Are Child Reports of Sexual Abuse Inherently "Reliable?"
The criteria of reliability are two fold. The first aspect is
whether child reports of abuse are inherently truthful. The second aspect is whether there are factors, other than truthfulness,
which would enhance or mitigate the reliability of a child's outof-court report of abuse. The question of truthfulness must be
assessed in an historical context. For most of the twentieth century, both law and psychology institutionalized theories and
practices which formally discounted reports of child sexual
abuse. As noted, Wigmore was the most influential legal authority to assert that reports of sexual abuse were often false. In a
scathing but scholarly law review article, Leigh Bienen reveals
that Wigmore supported his own personal and prejudiced beliefs with questionable, inaccurate and sometimes purposely
distorted "scientific evidence. '224 Despite modern evidence to
225
the contrary, Wigmore's legacy of misinformation lives on.
Today, Wigmore's theories about both child reports of sexual
226
abuse and the Confrontation Clause are disfavored.
In the field of psychology, Freud is the most influential figure to have formally discounted reports of child sexual abuse.
In his early psychoanalytic career, Freud believed his patients'
reports of child sexual abuse. When he decided the reports
could not be true, he was devestated. Only Freud himself can do
justice to his own confused thinking:
Influenced by Charcot's view of the traumatic origin of hysteria,
one was readily inclined to accept as true and aetiologically significant the statements made by patients in which they ascribed their
symptoms to passive sexual experiences in early childhoodbroadly speaking, to seduction. When this aetiology broke down
under its own improbability and under contradiction in definitely
ascertainable circumstances, the result at first was helpless bewilderment. Analysis had led by the right paths back to these sexual
traumas, and yet they were not true. Reality was lost from under
one's feet. At that time I would have gladly given up the whole
thing, just as my predecessor, Breur, had done when he made his
unwelcome discovery. Perhaps I persevered only because
227 I had no
choice and could not then begin again at anything else.
224. Bienen, supra note 11.
225. This legacy is reflected in modern statutes requiring corroborative
evidence in cases of child sexual abuse. See Lloyd, supra note 12.
226. See supra note 172 and accompanying text.
227.

(1914).

S. FREUD, THE HISTORY OF THE PSYCHOANALYTIC MOVEMENT 51-52
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Years later Freud commented:
If the reader feels inclined to shake his head at my credulity, I cannot altogether blame him ....
When, I was at last obliged to recognize that these scenes were only phantasies which my patients had
made up or which
I myself forced on them, I was for a time com228
pletely at a loss.
Freud's solution, of course, was the Oedipal complex, one of the
central tenets of psychoanalytic theory. Since that time, psychoanalytic theory has been used to attribute child reports of
sexual abuse, not to reality, but to fantasy.
Today many mental health experts believe that Freud had
discovered reality, a reality that was too difficult for him to accept. 229 Freud never reported a false accusation of incest. In
addition, there is evidence that he purposely suppressed evidence of an actual incident in one of his most influential case
studies. 230 However, psychoanalytic theory need not be discarded in order to maintain the inherent trustworthiness of
child reports of sexual abuse. Childhood fantasy can take many
forms, but it is bound by the child's cognitive limitations and
psychological immaturity. 23 1 Oedipal fantasy could not account
for the fact that child reports of sexual abuse often include vivid
descriptions of penile erection, ejaculation, semen, anal intercourse, fellatio and other "adult" behaviors. 232 Child reports
which include detailed accounts of sexual behavior are inherently more reliable than vague assertions which are congruent
with a young child's way of perceiving and fantasizing about the
world.
The foregoing discussion addresses the issue of unconscious fantasy but does not address the problem of conscious
lying. Do children lie about such incidents of sexual abuse? Do
they make false reports? The overwhelming opinion of mental
health workers, social welfare workers, and police investigators
is that children almost never make false reports. 233 Empirical
studies (one which involved the use of a polygraph) confirm the
228.

S. FREUD, AN Au'rOBIGRAPHICAL STuDY 34 (1925).

229. F. RUSH, THE BEST KEPT SECRET: SExuAL ABUSE OF CHILDREN
(1980); Incest Hoax, supra note 216. Peters, Children Who Are Victims of
Sexual Assault and the Psychology of Offenders, 30 AM. J. PSYCHOTHERAPY
398, 402 (1976). See generally Beinen, supra note 11, at 237 nn. 4-7.

230. Peters, supra note 229, at 402.
231. RUSH, supra note 229, at 80-81; Lloyd, supra note 12, at 105-6; Peters,
supra note 229, at 420.
232. Lloyd, supra note 12, at 105.
233. F. INBAU & J. REiD, CRIMINAL INTERROGATIONS AND CONFESSIONAL 111
(1976); RuSH, supra note 229, at 156; Incest Hoax, supra note 216.
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fact that false reports are extremely rare.2 3 4 Studies also indicate that false denials or retractions by the victim are actually
more common than false reports. 235 Of the few reported false
accusations, the child is usually coaxed to lie by an adult and
236
readily admits the lie upon direct questioning.
The Washington statute, which establishes a hearsay exception for child reports of sexual abuse, applies only to children
under ten years of age. 237 There is no empirical evidence to suggest that older children are more likely to make false reports,
but there are some sound psychological reasons for establishing
an age limit around ten years old. At this age, children are not
physically or psychologically sexually developed, nor have they
developed the cognitive facilities of adulthood. Children in the
age range of seven to eleven are still in the concrete-operational
stage of cognitive development. 238 Their thinking is often characterized by logical inconsistencies based on incapacities to use
symbolic logic, manipulate logical categories and consider logical alternatives. 239 These skills are not fully developed until the
child reaches the stage of formal-operational thought in early
adolescence. 24° Arguably, effective cross-examination depends
on the witness's ability to function at this more advanced stage
241
of cognitive development.
234. Incest Hoax, supra note 216; Groth, The Psychology of the Sexual

Offender, Workshop Presented By Psychological Associates of the Albemarle in Charlotte, N.C. (March 1980).

235. DEFRANCIS, PROTECTING THE CHILD VICTIM OF SEX CRIMES COMMITTED BY ADULTS, AMERICAN HUMANE ASSOCIATION (1969); Incest Hoax, supra

note 216.
236. Incest Hoax, supra note 216, at 270.
237. See supra note 135 and accompanying text.
238.
239.
240.
241.

J. FLAVELL, COGNrrrvE DEVELOPMENT 61-100 (1977).
Id. See generally Melton, Children's Competency, supra note 32.
J. Flavell, supranote 238, at 101-12.
These theories of cognitive stages were developed by Jean Piaget,

who also believed that children passed through different stages of moral
development. J. PIAGET, THE MORAL DEVELOPMENT OF THE CHILD (1932).

Lawrence Kohlberg, who has developed Piaget's theories of moral judgment, suggests children up to the age of nine are at the pre-conventional
level of moral judgment which roughly corresponds to Piaget's stage of het-

eronomous morality. Kohlberg, Moral Stages and Socialization: The Cognitive Development Approach, MORAL DEVELOPMENT AND BEHAVIOR:
THEORY RESEARCH AND SOCIAL ISSUES (T. Lickona ed. 1976). Children at
this stage are characterized by their egocentrism and their inability to effec-

tively view social relations from the perspective of others. To lie effectively
about being sexually abused in order to punish someone requires considerable cognitive skill which most young children do not have. This does not
mean that children do not lie, but only that their ability to lie is limited by

their egocentrism, cognitive functioning and social immaturity. Burton,
Honesty and Dishonesty,MORAL DEVELOPMENT AND BEHAVIOR: THEORY, RESEARCH AND SOCIAL ISSUES, (T. Lickona ed. 1976). As children grow older
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One irony of these cognitive-developmental considerations
is that the lack of the child's cognitive skills increases rather
than decreases the inherent reliability of reports of sexual
abuse. A second irony is that the child's hearsay report of sexual abuse may be more inherently reliable than the child's
courtroom testimony under cross-examination. A child's testimony could be completely truthful but suffer from lapses of
memory, incomplete details and even logical inconsistencies. 242
Trauma, guilt and fear resulting from testifying in an open courtroom and in the presence of the offender, may further reduce
the child's ability to testify effectively. One leading commentator on psycholegal issues speculates: "[I]t is plausible that faceto-face confrontation by particularly vulnerable victims (like
children) may actually diminish reliability of their testimony
rather than enhance it ....,,243
This brief review of the relevant psychological literature
suggests that a child's out-of-court statements of sexual abuse
are inherently reliable. False accusations are extremely rare;
false denials and recantations are much more common. Psychoanalytic theories of incestuous fantasy do not detract from the
inherent reliability of reports of sexual abuse. Limiting such
new hearsay exceptions to children under ten or eleven years
old may, however, provide an extra measure of reliability due to
factors of emotional cognitive and sexual development. These
same cognitive and emotional limitations may significantly detract from the child's ability to testify reliably and effectively. A
child's out-of-court statement of abuse may be more reliable
than the child's in-court testimony.
VI.

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

Legal intervention in response to child sexual abuse is often
said to constitute a second victimization of the child. Reform
efforts to protect child victims within the legal system include
two recent proposals to admit into evidence a child's prior statements of sexual abuse. The first proposal would simply create a
new hearsay exception for child reports of abuse. The second
proposal would admit into evidence special videotaped interviews and depositions which, depending on the specific proposal, may or may not provide for full cross-examination and direct
face-to-face confrontation. The present system of traditional
they are capable of assuming the perspective of others to create more convincing lies and to use lies more cleverly to punish others.
242. C. ADAms &J. FAys, No MORE SECRETS 63 (1981); Melton, Children's
Competency, supra note 29.
243. Melton, ProceduralReforms, supranote 3, at 189.
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hearsay exceptions and modern residuals allows some flexibility
for admitting a child's prior statements of sexual abuse. However, the existing exceptions to the hearsay rule do not adequately protect the child victim through the legal process.
Today, attitudes toward societal intervention have shifted
away from a punitive model which removed the child from the
home, prosecuted the offender and destroyed the family. Progressive intervention models are based on temporary removal of
the offender from the home, individual and family psychotherapy and ultimate reunification and strengthening of the family.
However, offenders often rely on a strong system of denial and
rationalization to avoid voluntary treatment. Coercive legal
pressure, such as pre-trial diversion, is often necessary to initiate the offender's investment in treatment. Therefore, new
hearsay exceptions which potentially facilitate prosecution
should be a shared goal of the legal system and mental health
community.
Statutes which establish new hearsay exceptions for a
child's out-of-court statements of sexual abuse appear to be constitutionally sound. In fact, these statutes incorporate the necessity and reliability criteria of the leading Supreme Court
cases which attempt to reconcile the hearsay doctrine and the
Confrontation Clause. However, it remains unclear how courts
will interpret the necessity and reliability criteria in cases of
child sexual abuse. Specifically, it is unclear how far courts will
go in recognizing new forms of "psychological unavailability" for
victim-witnesses who are physically available to testify. It is
also unclear how courts will assess the inherent reliability of
newly legislated hearsay exceptions under present Confrontation Clause analysis.
Proposals to admit videotaped interviews and depositions
into evidence may not receive a similar degree of constitutional
support. While there is adequate precedent for taking depositions of traumatized victims, many proposals to protect child
victims place some limits on the right to cross-examination and
face-to-face confrontation. Such limitations are said to satisfy
the necessity and reliability criteria which the Supreme Court
uses to reconcile the Confrontation Clause with the hearsay
doctrine. However, courts treat depositions differently from
other forms of hearsay because of strong policy interests which
favor live testimony, the presence of available witnesses, the
right to face-to-face confrontation and other Confrontation
Clause values.
Ironically, courts may be willing to uphold new hearsay exceptions for child reports of sexual abuse which provide for no
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cross-examination and confrontation, while at the same time
striking down new taped interview and deposition procedures
which only minimally restrict the defendant's right to cross-examination and face-to-face confrontation. This irony has already been tested in the United States court of appeals.
One reason for this irony is the strict evidentiary approach
which the Supreme Court takes to the Confrontation Clause.
By relying on the keywords of necessity and reliability, the
Court reduces all considerations of competing societal interests
to evidentiary criteria which date back to the common law. In
contrast, the Court balances first amendment rights against the
compelling state interest in protecting child victims of sexual assault. While the first and sixth amendments may be said to protect different rights and require differential analysis, it is
unlikely that common-law evidentiary criteria can resolve these
subtle constitutional tensions.
For the present, the hearsay doctrine and the Confrontation
Clause are reconciled by the criteria of necessity and reliability.
The available psychological evidence, although incomplete, suggests that the newly proposed hearsay exceptions for child
statements of sexual abuse are necessary and inherently reliable. Children are often psychologically or otherwise unavailable
to testify in such cases. A child's out-of-court statements of sexual abuse are not only inherently reliable but may even be more
reliable than the same child's in-court testimony. This would
prove an exception to the most fundamental assumptions underlying the hearsay doctrine and Confrontation Clause, which
after all, were formulated at a time when children were generally regarded as incompetent witnesses and when society denied the problem of child sexual abuse.
Although present Confrontation Clause analysis and present psychological theory leave many questions unanswered,
there is sufficient constitutional support and psychological evidence to justify continued implementation of new hearsay exceptions and taped deposition procedures for a child's
statements of sexual abuse. These new proposals will challenge
the judicial system to reconcile the Confrontation Clause, the
hearsay doctrine and competing societal interests. Perhaps
these proposals will serve as a social experiment, testing the
flexibility of modern Confrontation Clause analysis to allow for
the progressive growth of the hearsay doctrine in response to
newly identified social issues and our expanding knowledge of
the human condition.

